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FLAWED BUT NOBLE: DESEGREGATION LITIGATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
David Marcus

 
[I]f by any chance the desegregation case could be found by 
a judge not to be a class action after the adoption of the rule, 
we would of course be in a very, very bad way. If there is 
any doubt on the matter, we certainly ought to carry 
language which includes the desegregation suit. So if there 
be any question about it, [Rule 23(b)](2) ought to remain in. 
 
 Benjamin Kaplan, Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, 
November 1, 1963.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the perspective of the present day, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure contains a difficult puzzle. After a court certifies a class 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) in a money damages case, absent class members 
must receive notice and have a chance to opt out. Their counterparts in 
injunctive or declaratory relief suits prosecuted pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) do 
not.
2
 As long understood, the class certification decision essentially equals a 
determination to bind all class members to the eventual judgment.
3
 Class 
members seeking money damages therefore have some control over their 
rights to sue before these rights are finally extinguished. In contrast, 
injunctive relief class members must remain in the class. 
This puzzling link between procedural rights and remedial choice has 
constitutional ramifications. Rule 23‘s power lies in the expansive res 
judicata its judgments generate.
4
 Because a right to sue ostensibly belongs to 
                                                                                                                       
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). For simplicity purposes, and because most Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions seek injunctions, I refer to injunctive relief as the prototypical Rule 23(b)(2) remedy. 
 3. See Charles W. Joiner, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Mich. Sch. of Law, Proposed Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—A Step Forward (Sept. 12, 1964), at 7 in CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT PAPERS, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas, Box 257, Folder 4 [hereinafter WRIGHT 
PAPERS] (―[The proposed Rule 23] provides for an early court order as to whether it is to be 
maintained as a class action (in other words, whether it is to be considered as res judicata as to the 
class.) [sic]‖); cf. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1261–62 (2002) (describing the relationship between class certification and 
preclusion). Historically, this was not always so. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr. and the Lessons of History, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010). 
 4. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 
2
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an individual class member as his or her property,
5
 however, this benefit 
also triggers a due process problem. A preclusive judgment amounts to a 
final sale of a right to sue.
6
 The exchange of property it entails means that an 
individual ordinarily must have her day in court before res judicata may 
constitutionally attach.
7
 As a nearly unique exception to this ―‗deep-rooted 
historic tradition,‘‖8 the class action requires some other source of 
legitimacy.  Notice and opt-out rights, at least in theory if not so much in 
reality, help in this regard. The failure to opt out arguably indicates class 
members‘ consent to a judgment pursued in their names. An alternate 
function departs from the idea that a judgment can extinguish a person‘s 
right to sue without her actual participation in the litigation, so long as 
someone else represents her interests adequately.
9
 Notice and opt-out rights 
act as procedural safeguards to ensure that classes do not suffer from 
conflicts of interest. Either way, some form of notice (less controversially) 
and opt-out rights (more so) are arguably woven into Rule 23‘s 
constitutional fabric.
10
 Yet, the rule eschews them for injunctive relief 
suits.
11
 
 Decades after Rule 23‘s modern reincarnation in 1966, a number of 
courts and commentators have ventured solutions to this puzzle, but, as I 
describe in Part I, none has wide acceptance. This disarray leaves class 
action doctrine remarkably unstable in a number of ways. The Supreme 
Court, for example, concluded in 1985 that due process requires notice and 
opt-out rights in Rule 23(b)(3) suits for money damages. With no 
explanation, it expressly declined to say whether the same is true in 
injunctive relief cases, which, if so, would render Rule 23(b)(2) 
                                                                                                                       
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 355. 
 5. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, 
WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 
5 (2009). But cf. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1977–81 
(2008) (reviewing RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007)). 
 6. See NAGAREDA, supra note 5, at ix. 
 7. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 8. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 
U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). 
 9. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 977 (1993). 
 10. In this Article, I discuss notice and opt-out rights together, although I am aware that they do 
not necessarily stand on the same constitutional footing, and that the doctrinal and practical 
arguments for their inclusion or exclusion in different types of cases might vary. I do so because I 
believe the most conceptually defensible account of opt-out rights is that, assuming they have any 
value, they help ensure the adequacy of class member interest representation. See infra Part I.A. 
Notice does as well.  But there are instances when it does not make sense to discuss them as if they 
function identically, and I have tried to note these instances. 
 11. A court in its discretion may order notice to class members in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). Whether it can order opt-out rights in a (b)(2) suit is uncertain at present. 
Compare Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2010) (approving district 
court‘s decision to require notice and opt-out rights in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit), with id. at 648 (Ikuta, J., 
dissenting) (insisting that Rule 23(b)(2) does not permit opt-out rights). 
3
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unconstitutional.
12
 Befuddlement at these rights‘ selective enjoyment likely 
contributed to this confusion. 
 In this Article, I excavate the historical answer to the Rule 23 puzzle, 
one that suggests that the rule‘s structure has little to do with theoretical 
distinctions between types of remedies. Far more important was the 
particular moment in American history during which the Federal Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee (the ―1966 authors‖) undertook the revision of Rule 
23. To capture this moment, I reconstruct a neglected chapter in procedural 
history that stretches from 1938, when the first Rule 23 went into force, to 
the early 1960s, when the 1966 authors labored.
13
 I pay particular attention 
to Rule 23‘s experience in desegregation litigation, which generated the sole 
doctrinal foundation for the class-wide res judicata that the remade Rule 23 
would facilitate. Others have exhaustively chronicled the story of the legal 
campaign against Jim Crow, but until now, it has lacked this procedural 
chapter.
14
 Finally, I mine the surviving transcripts, memoranda, and letters 
the 1966 authors created as they revised Rule 23, in order to unearth their 
reasons for treating money damages and injunctive relief class members 
differently.
15
 
This history yields an answer to the Rule 23 puzzle that roots modern 
class action doctrine in a moment of supreme nobility, but one that also 
                                                                                                                       
 12. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 811–12 & n.3 (1985); see also Patricia Anne 
Solomon, Note, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1627 
(1997). 
 13. Others have offered quick and impressionistic histories of this period, but mine is the first 
thorough account of the doctrinal raw material with which the 1966 authors worked. See STEPHEN C. 
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 228–37 (1987) 
(offering an account of class action doctrine post-1938 without much discussion of actual case law 
from the time); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class 
Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1937–46 (1998) (discussing mainly the 1940s); see also Robert G. 
Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative 
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 287–90 (1990) (reviewing Yeazell‘S From Medieval Group 
Litigation to the Modern Class Action and devoting three pages of an article that focuses on 18th and 
19th Century doctrine to the 1938–1966 period). I do not intend my observations in any sense as a 
criticism of these important works. 
 14. Professor James E. Pfander touches upon aspects of this story in three pages of a recent 
article but does not go into any detail to show how substance and procedure intertwined in 
desegregation litigation. James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 
24 LAW & INEQ. 47, 70–72 (2006). 
 15. The two commentators to have combed through the documentation of the 1966 authors‘ 
efforts addressed subjects quite different from what I treat here. See John K. Rabiej, The Making of 
Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 333–44 (2005) (focusing 
mainly on Rule 23(b)(3)); Judith Resnik, From ―Cases‖ to ―Litigation,‖ 54 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 5, 6–15 (1991) (describing the 1966 authors‘ positions with respect to mass torts). Professor 
Stephen Yeazell speculates (mostly accurately) as to the motives of the 1966 authors but without the 
benefit of this historical record. YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 259–61. Professor Robert G. Bone 
acknowledges that ―[t]he paucity of source material and research bearing on the 1966 Advisory 
Committee‘s reasons for drafting Rule 23 in the way it did makes any inferences about Committee 
intent somewhat hazardous and necessarily tentative.‖ Bone, supra note 13, at 292. He considers and 
rejects the answer to the Rule 23 puzzle I believe this documentation supports. Id. at 296.  
4
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presents some challenging implications for this doctrine going forward.  
Rule 23(b)(2) was written for a very specific purpose. Judicial sympathy for 
racial integration and the 1966 authors‘ political commitments, rather than 
some conception of what due process requires, best explain why Rule 23 
requires the mandatory class treatment of injunctive relief claims.  
Until 1966, judgments could bind and benefit absent class members only 
in specific, narrow instances, an infirmity that made class action practice 
largely a backwater.
16
 Desegregation litigation, in which black plaintiffs 
invariably relied on Rule 23, was an exception. Courts permitted class 
treatment of equal protection claims and issued broadly preclusive 
judgments. They did so first in a limited range of cases then, as judges 
sympathetic to integration began to dominate the southern federal bench, 
even in instances where class members likely had deep and fundamental 
conflicts of interest. I describe the general course of 1938–1966 class action 
doctrine and this desegregation anomaly in Parts II and III, respectively. 
The 1966 authors expected and hoped that all judgments obtained 
pursuant to their revised rule would generate res judicata for absent class 
members. No trans-substantive explanation appears in available records for 
why they thought this expansion in preclusion required notice and opt-out 
rights for Rule 23(b)(3) class members but not for their Rule 23(b)(2) 
brethren. Indeed, these records contradict attempts in present-day case law 
and commentary to solve this puzzle in such terms.  
The fact that the 1966 authors shaped Rule 23(b)(2)‘s contours 
exclusively in response to the circumstances of early 1960s desegregation 
litigation suggests an answer, which I provide in Part IV. Casual 
observations of Rule 23(b)(2)‘s connection to civil rights litigation are 
legion.
17
  The extent of its ideological design and how and why it came to 
be, however, have gone much less appreciated, particularly as the focus in 
class action commentary has shifted to mass torts and securities litigation in 
recent years. The conflicts of interest among class members that notice and 
opt-out rights might help highlight would have strengthened arguments 
against allowing desegregation cases to proceed as class suits. Rule 
23(b)(2)‘s champions ardently supported litigation-driven integration, and 
they believed class treatment of equal protection claims essential to its 
success. Relying on doctrine developed by integrationist federal judges at 
approximately the same time, the 1966 authors drafted a provision that 
could help judges ignore or bury such conflicts. 
                                                                                                                       
 16. See Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Professor of Law, to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor 
of Law, Harvard Law Sch. (Apr. 3, 1962), microformed on CIS-6310-28 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. 
Info. Serv.) (noting that Rule 23‘s ―present [] murkiness has deterred widespread use of the class 
action‖). 
 17. E.g., 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1775 (3d ed. Supp. 2007). Professor Judith Resnik has situated Rule 23 in a 
broader trajectory of the purposeful, instrumental development of procedural doctrine to serve 
particular concerns of substantive justice. Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and 
the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers‘ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 650–52 
(2011). 
5
Marcys: Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications f
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
662 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
No theory of interest representation, or other trans-substantive theory for 
that matter, justified this selective provision of notice and opt-out rights. 
Rule 23‘s resistance to a cogent justification in purely procedural terms thus 
hardly surprises. Indeed, an observer of class action practice in the mid-
1960s may not have bothered to try to explain Rule 23 accordingly, fully 
appreciating the substantive purpose lurking in Rule 23(b)(2)‘s substance-
neutral terms. In one sense, then, my ambition in this Article is modest. I 
simply want to recreate the historical milieu out of which Rule 23 emerged. 
But the story I tell has profound implications for class action doctrine 
and even for the very ideal of trans-substantivity in civil procedure. The 
need for substantive context to explain Rule 23 means at the least that 
modern class action doctrine suffers from a noble flaw. Concerns of 
substantive justice relevant in a particular era provided part of the normative 
foundation for an ostensibly substance-neutral rule. But this substance-
specificity destabilizes fundamental aspects of contemporary class action 
doctrine. This Article‘s heart lies with the historical connection between 
civil rights and Rule 23, but I also discuss some of these current 
implications in Part V. 
I.  THE RULE 23 PUZZLE 
The Rule 23 puzzle has prompted a number of proposed solutions from 
courts and commentators bent on making sense of it without recourse to 
substantive context. The prominent ones share two features: they stress the 
functions notice and opt-out rights play, and they attempt to explain the 
connection between procedural rights and remedial choice in trans-
substantive terms.  None is necessarily wrong, although I have my doubts 
about each. What is interesting is their proliferation and divergence, disarray 
that indicates the wisdom in reverse-engineering Rule 23 to figure out why 
it developed the way it did.  
A.  The Functions of Notice and Opt-Out Rights 
The present Rule 23 is pragmatic by design.
18
 The roles notice and opt-
out rights play thus should have some connection to why the plaintiff‘s 
choice of remedy determines when Rule 23 requires these rights. By one 
account, they have an autonomy function, ensuring that individuals retain 
control over their claims and can dictate when and under what conditions 
they will attempt to vindicate them.
19
 Another account stresses their 
relationship to what legitimates class-wide res judicata.
20
 Judgments take 
rights to sue away from absent class members without their participation or 
consent, an apparent usurpation of property that needs some justification.
21
  
                                                                                                                       
 18. E.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 3, at 1259. 
 19. E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999). 
 20. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 
785–86 (2005). 
 21. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 355–56. 
6
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Notice and opt-out rights can help. An unconvincing autonomy-based 
assertion that a class member who receives notice and fails to opt out 
consents to be bound persists.
22
 More plausibly, these rights serve as 
―procedural safeguards‖ of adequate representation.23 Due process requires 
the adequate representation of interests to bind an absent class member to a 
judgment.
24
 A class representative whose interests conflict with those he 
purports to represent cannot satisfy this adequacy requirement and obtain a 
judgment that extinguishes absent class members‘ claims.25 Although Rule 
23(a)(4) requires a finding of adequate representation before class 
certification, notice and opt-out rights contribute to ensure the requisite 
harmony of interests in one of several ways. First, notice can force intraclass 
conflicts to the surface by inviting absent class members to weigh in. 
Second, those with conflicting interests can exit, removing fissures from the 
class.
26
 Third, the threat that opt-outs would either diminish the value of the 
remaining aggregated claims or cause the court to question the quality of 
representation might incentivize representatives particularly to heed absent 
class members‘ interests.27  
Several proposed solutions to the Rule 23 puzzle depart from the idea 
that notice and opt-out rights add to the due process ballast for class-wide 
preclusion. Injunctive relief classes either have an intrinsic harmony that 
itself guarantees the required interest representation, or the pragmatic 
benefit of mandatory class treatment outweighs any cost of foregone rights 
in the due process balance. Other proposed solutions explain their selective 
enjoyment in autonomy terms. 
                                                                                                                       
 22. See YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 255–56; Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative 
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 
580 (2011) (describing this idea as the ―standard account‖). As well documented, the consent-based 
justification for notice and opt-out rights is quite weak. E.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Rethinking 
Certification and Notice in Opt-Out Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 637, 642 (2006). Also, opt-out 
rights may provide litigants‘ autonomy in theory but not so in practice. See Martin Redish, Peter 
Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A 
Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 618 (2010) (―In many class actions, the 
claims of the individual class members are extremely small. . .  . Moreover, even when individual 
class members have received notification of their rights to compensation from a general fund, their 
claims will often be so small that their size fails to justify the effort and expense of pursuing those 
claims on an individual basis.‖).   
 23. Fiss, supra note 9, at 977; Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 366–70.  
 24. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–94 (2008); Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: 
Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1089. 
 25. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997); Uhl v. Thoroughbred 
Tech. & Telecomms. Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 985 (7th Cir. 2002); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 
F.3d 249, 260–61 (2d Cir. 2001), aff‘d in part, vacated in part per curiam, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003). 
 26. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2004); see also 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
288, 308–09 (2010); cf. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the 
Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164–74 (2003) (offering a richly theorized account in line 
with this explanation).  
7
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B.  Intrinsic Harmony  
Courts primarily justify mandatory participation of absent class members 
in injunctive relief suits on the ground that all in the class have intrinsically 
harmonious interests. The group cohesion this unity creates ensures that 
representatives necessarily represent absent class members adequately.
28
 
The fact that a 23(b)(2) class is an actual group that exists in the real world, 
not some assemblage cobbled together for the sake of expediency, motivates 
this presumption of cohesion. The Advisory Committee notes on Rule 
23(b)(2) offer an illustrative example: a group of black children challenging 
segregation in their local school district. These students share common 
experiences with racism in a particular locality, not just a coincidental 
interest in the same type of relief from the same defendant. They identify 
strongly with the group to which they belong and arguably derive important 
aspects of their identity—aspects at issue in the litigation—from the group 
itself. Individuals‘ interests are intertwined and thus harmonious.29 Notice 
and opt-out rights would merely gild the lily. 
This presumption lacks any basis in fact. Conflicts of interest abound in 
Rule 23(b)(2) suits.
30
 Many or even most absent class members might not 
want the injunctive relief ostensibly sought in their names.
31
 If anything, 
classes in suits for money damages likely have fewer and less entrenched 
fissures. A class member in a race discrimination case might care much 
more about how a court shapes injunctive relief than the amount or 
distribution of damages pursued in her name might worry a class member in 
a low-value consumer protection action.
32
 
C.  Pragmatism 
Commentators tend to favor more pragmatic solutions to the Rule 23 
puzzle that eschew the sort of fictionalized assertions about intrinsic 
harmony that populate the case law. As two examples show, these proposed 
                                                                                                                       
 28. In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (8th Cir. 2005); Coleman v. Gen. 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Metro-North 
Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 
402, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1998); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975); see 
also Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 313, 315 (1973). 
 29. E.g., Holmes v. Cont‘l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983).  
 30. E.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505–11 (1976); C. Douglas Floyd, Civil Rights 
Class Actions in the 1980‘s: The Burger Court‘s Pragmatic Approach to Problems of Adequate 
Representation and Justiciability, 1984 BYU L. REV. 1, 18–31; Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in 
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1187–89 (1982); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural 
Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 366–68 (1988); Stephen 
C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 
UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1111–14 (1980).  
 31. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1131–32 (D.D.C. 1989); Messier v. Southbury 
Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350, 356–57 (D. Conn. 1998). 
 32. See, e.g., YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 253. 
8
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solutions ultimately if implicitly depart from the idea of procedural due 
process as a context-sensitive balancing test.  
Perhaps due process does not require notice and opt-out rights in 
injunctive relief suits because they promise no practical benefit to absent 
class members and their eschewal comes at no practical cost. When a court 
enjoins a defendant who acts ―on grounds that apply generally to the 
class,‖33 as 23(b)(2) requires, it often cannot individualize the remedy.34 A 
court could not enjoin enforcement of a juvenile curfew ordinance on First 
Amendment grounds, for example, then craft an injunction that benefits only 
certain of the city‘s teenagers. Remedial indivisibility means that individuals 
who sit on the sidelines in practical effect have their rights adjudicated, 
whether they are class members or not. The right to exclude themselves 
from the litigation would give absent class members no benefit.
35
 They also 
suffer no harm from mandatory joinder.
36
 Any individual plaintiff could 
obtain the same injunctive relief that a class representative could win and, 
even without class certification, practically (if not formally) resolve 
nonparties‘ claims. Nonparties and absent class members share the same 
position, so whether the latter can opt out or not is academic. 
This remedial indivisibility justification has difficulties. It fails as a 
descriptive account of Rule 23(b)(2) doctrine. The rule permits class 
certification in instances where relief is readily divisible.
37
 Also, while the 
justification may make sense for opt-out rights—injunctive relief may well 
be indivisible and opting out futile—it does not explain why notice is not 
needed. Indeed, given the indivisibility of relief, one might expect more 
punctilious notice to ensure the best possible representation of the broadest 
spectrum of interests before a court necessarily decides the fate of all. 
Even if Rule 23(b)(2) were limited to instances of remedial 
indivisibility, and even if Rule 23 required notice to injunctive relief class 
members, the justification is incomplete. The position of nonparties and 
absent class members differs in an important respect in indivisible relief 
cases. If an individual plaintiff loses after certification, nothing prevents 
subsequent plaintiffs from trying to obtain the relief. If the class plaintiff 
loses, in contrast, res judicata bars any further litigation by absent class 
members.
38
 Individual and class litigation have similar implications for 
nonparties and absent class members only if the plaintiff prevails. 
                                                                                                                       
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 34. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 925–26 (1998); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, at 
112 (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW]. 
 35. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 34, § 2.072, at 156. 
 36. Id. § 2.04, at 112–14. 
 37. One example might be a suit to challenge a school district‘s diversity plan. A white parent 
whose daughter was assigned to a school outside her neighborhood could bring a class action under 
Rule 23(b)(2) on behalf of all similarly situated parents, even if the child could have been made 
entirely whole had a court required the neighborhood school to admit her and her alone. See Martin 
H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1609 (2007).  
 38. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., 
9
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Professor Richard Nagareda offers a different pragmatic answer to the 
Rule 23 puzzle.
39
 Mandatory class treatment solves the problem created 
when two ―preexisting‖ rights conflict. Rule 23(b)(2) encompasses cases 
that do not raise individual causation or damages issues. Because every 
prospective plaintiff‘s claim is exactly the same, ―it is not possible to 
ascertain the legality of the defendant‘s conduct as to one affected claimant 
without necessarily doing so as to all others.‖40 The defendant has a right ―to 
rely upon a judicial decision that its conduct is lawful . . . .‖41 But existing 
res judicata doctrine gives subsequent plaintiffs ―a preexisting right . . . to 
escape the issue preclusive effect of a losing lawsuit by one of their ilk.‖42 
Put differently, they can bring precisely the same claim over and over again. 
The preexisting right of the second plaintiff to sue conflicts with the 
preexisting right of the defendant to rely on the clean bill of health.
43
 
Mandatory class treatment is an ―instrumentalism of last resort‖ that 
sacrifices the rights of individuals to control their own claims to the greater 
good of resolving the conflict between preexisting rights.
44
 
Nagareda‘s pragmatic explanation prompts several objections. First, the 
Federal Rules more generally do not recognize harm caused by relitigation 
(in Nagareda‘s terms, the infringement of the defendant‘s preexisting right) 
as sufficient to displace an individual plaintiff‘s control over her right to 
sue.
45
 The harm that repetitive litigation causes to a defendant can require 
joinder but only when multiple suits might result in conflicting obligations 
that the defendant could not possibly fulfill.
46
 Rule 23(b)(1)(A), not Rule 
23(b)(2), handles this problem for class actions.
47
 Also, if protection to 
                                                                                                                       
concurring); Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 
B.U. L. Rev. 597, 603 (1983). 
 39. Nagareda, supra note 27, at 232; see also Redish & Larsen, supra note 37, at 1605–09.  
 40. Nagareda, supra note 27, at 232. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 230. For a different but related account of class treatment for injunctive relief claims, 
see OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 487 (1972). 
 45. The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell apparently did not conclude that defendants‘ 
interests in avoiding repetitive litigation supported a more broadly sweeping nonparty preclusion rule. 
See Brief of Respondent The Fairchild Corp. at 47–48, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (No. 
07-371). 
 46. Under Rule 19, for example, a defendant can force the joinder of a nonparty only when, 
absent joinder, the defendant might be ―unable to comply with one court‘s order without breaching 
another court‘s order concerning the same incident.‖ Delgado v. Plaza Las Ams., Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 3 
(1st Cir. 1998). Rule 22 authorizes a party to file an interpleader action when the party may be liable 
to different claimants, but it applies in instances when the liabilities are inconsistent with each other. 
Otherwise, the Federal Rules contemplate purely permissive joinder under Rule 20. See Martin H. 
Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-In-Court Ideal: 
Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1895–1900 (2009). 
 47. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was intended to reach the same sort of situation as Rule 19 does. 
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388–89 (1967). A situation where a plaintiff sues to 
obtain an injunction and the defendant believes that nonparties might sue for the same injunction, 
10
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defendants justifies the mandatory class treatment of injunctive relief 
claims, they do not seem particularly grateful for it. Far from happily 
agreeing to class certification in injunctive relief suits, or even moving for 
class certification themselves, defendants hardly ever support class 
certification.
48
 Finally, Nagareda‘s account, like the remedial indivisibility 
justification, does not explain why absent class members do not at least 
receive notice.
49
 Before a court issues an indivisible injunction and thereby 
resolves everyone‘s claim, it stands to reason that the court should order 
notice, provide some sort of mechanism to solicit others‘ opinions, and 
thereby probe for conflicts of interest. Indeed, courts in the exercise of their 
discretion on occasion do so, just not because Rule 23 requires them to.
50
 
D.  Autonomy 
A third approach to the Rule 23 puzzle recharacterizes the relationship 
between absent class members and rights to sue in injunctive relief cases to 
eliminate the due process challenge that mandatory class treatment poses. 
Two proposed solutions illustrate. For Professor Samuel Issacharoff, rights 
litigated in Rule 23(b)(2) cases belong primarily to groups. Because they do 
not have individually owned rights to sue at stake, absent class members 
warrant less of the due process protection that notice and opt-out rights 
afford.  
Issacharoff argues that when ―there is little realistic prospect for 
individual control of claims,‖ an individual has standing to sue, but the right 
really belongs to the group as a whole.
51
 To rehearse his example, a school 
desegregation suit does not address a single student‘s personal right to 
attend a particular school.
52
 Rather, it cannot but resolve the problem for all 
                                                                                                                       
even after the defendant defeats the first plaintiff‘s claim, is not sufficient on its own to trigger Rule 
19. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Cmty. v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 976 
(9th Cir. 2008). Arguably, Rule 23(b)(1)(A) doctrine, as it has evolved, applies more broadly than 
Rule 19 does—essentially to any instance in which the class action seeks exclusively injunctive or 
declaratory relief. E.g., Franklin v. Barry, 909 F. Supp. 21, 31 (D.D.C. 1995). This evolution renders 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(2) mostly duplicative. E.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 34, 
§ 2.04, at 121–22 (reporter‘s note to comment a). This merger in class action doctrine is at odds with 
what the 1966 authors intended for Rule 23(b)(2). See infra Part IV.C; see also YEAZELL, supra note 
13, at 257–59. 
 48. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1166 n.120 
(2009). 
 49. In his defense, the chapter of the American Law Institute‘s Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation that Nagareda drafted recognizes that the enjoyment of notice should not 
depend formally on the type of remedy pursued. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 34, § 2.07, at 
143. 
 50. E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd.of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 210 (D. Conn. 1968) (invoking 
the discretionary notice provision of Rule 23(c)); cf. Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 93–94 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (recognizing the court‘s discretion to allow opt-out rights under Rule 23 class actions). 
 51. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2002). But see Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The 
Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 792–93 n.174 (2007). 
 52. Issacharoff, supra note 51, at 1058–59; see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of 
11
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similarly situated children. The uniformity of all children‘s claims means 
that the decision necessarily resolves all of them on the merits, and the 
indivisible nature of an integration injunction necessarily affects all children 
equally.
53
 This indivisibility has ownership ramifications. Under such 
circumstances, ―a claim cannot be thought to belong to an individual 
plaintiff,‖54 and an ―individual cannot claim an autonomous right to separate 
control of the outcome of the legal challenge.‖55  
Professor Robert  Bone‘s solution differs but, in due process terms, 
works similarly.
56
 Representative suits in the 19th Century could bind absent 
class members (to use the term anachronistically) when the suit involved so-
called impersonal rights, or rights ―that belonged to an indefinite class qua 
class and to each class member simply by virtue of his occupying a legally 
prescribed and fixed status.‖57 The suit adjudicated ―the legal incidents of 
status that defined the class,‖ a status that individuals shared incidentally 
and identically.
58
 These individuals had weak autonomy-based claims to 
individual control over rights to sue ―because the lawsuit and the judgment 
involved them in only an impersonal way.‖59 
Bone speculates that the 1966 authors drew on this notion of impersonal 
rights as a justification for the mandatory class treatment of injunctive relief 
claims.
60
 Rule 23(b)(2) targets instances ―when the defendant has acted 
toward a group qua group without singling out any individual for special 
treatment.‖61 In a civil rights case, for example, the defendant has targeted 
particular individuals only incidentally—the defendant ―has acted or refused 
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,‖ to quote Rule 
23(b)(2)
62—because they happen to be members of a particular race. No one 
has been singled out individually. Also, the remedy—―final injunctive 
relief‖ that is ―appropriate respecting the class as a whole,‖ as Rule 23(b)(2) 
provides
63—only benefits individuals indirectly ―as a result of their 
possessing the general attributes of group membership.‖64 It requires no 
individualized application. Individuals have marginal autonomy interests in 
controlling their rights to sue, particularly because ―individuals have no 
unilateral power to affect the formal incidents of a legally defined 
                                                                                                                       
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979). 
 53. Issacharoff, supra note 51, at 1059. 
 54. Id. at 1064. 
 55. Id. at 1058. 
 56. See Bone, supra note 22, at 607; Bone, supra note 13, at 296–99. It is important to note 
that Bone‘s account is primarily descriptive, in the sense that he tries to make sense of the sweep of 
class action history and current doctrine, and not normative, in the sense that he would design Rule 
23 from scratch based on the same set of claims. 
 57. Bone, supra note 22, at 606. 
 58. Id. at 607. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Bone, supra note 13, at 292. 
 61. Bone, supra note 22, at 611. 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Bone, supra note 22, at 611. 
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status . . . .‖65 In contrast, in damages cases, the defendant has singled each 
class member out differently, as evidenced by differing injuries, and the 
damages calculation for each is individualized. These strengthen the 
autonomy claim for some individualized mechanism, like notice and opt-out 
rights, to control one‘s own litigation destiny. 
 These autonomy-based solutions raise concerns. Issacharoff‘s falls short 
of a positive account of Rule 23(b)(2) because, as discussed, the provision 
permits class treatment when injunctive relief is divisible. The reconception 
of property interests also begs difficult normative questions. If rights to sue 
―cannot be thought to belong to an individual plaintiff,‖66 should their class-
wide adjudication trigger any due process protections at all? Are absent 
class members‘ preferences wholly irrelevant, such that a self-appointed 
private attorney could commandeer their claims solely to pursue his own 
policy goals? 
Bone‘s explanation also gives pause. As he recognizes, the pragmatically 
inclined 1966 authors intended their revision to jettison vestiges of 19th 
Century formalism.
67
 Bone suggests that, rather than focus on abstract 
categories of rights and remedies, the 1966 authors stressed the nature of the 
defendant‘s conduct and how relief would operate to distinguish on 
autonomy grounds between injunctive relief and money damages suits.
68
 But 
a formalistic grain remains in this account. It is not obvious why litigant 
autonomy in the class action context hinges solely on the defendant‘s modus 
operandi and the administration of relief. Put differently, why does 
autonomy kick in and require notice and opt-out rights just because the 
distribution of damages requires an individualized assessment of injury?
69
 
At any rate, the documentation of the 1966 authors‘ efforts demonstrates 
little appreciation of the detailed history Bone marshals to support his 
account and at times conflicts with it.
70
 
                                                                                                                       
 65. Id. 
 66. Issacharoff, supra note 51, at 1064. 
 67. Bone, supra note 13, at 299–301. 
 68. Id. at 301. 
 69. Bone stresses that the ―(b)(2) [class action] category  applies when the defendant has acted 
 . . . without singling out any individual for special treatment . . . .‖  Bone, supra note 22, at 611.  
Perhaps an explanation lies in this idea of ―singling out.‖ If the defendant has treated individuals qua 
individuals, then they have an autonomy right to litigation control. If not, autonomy interests are 
weaker. This explanation makes perfect sense but is not self-evident and requires further moral 
philosophical grounding. Moreover, the claim that defendants in damages cases ―single out‖ 
individual class members is only formally true. As a practical matter, no mass tort or consumer 
protection has any particular individual actually in mind when it embarks on its injurious behavior. 
To the (b)(2) and (b)(3) defendant, the class is just that—a class whose individual members matter 
not at all. 
 70. Professor Benjamin Kaplan appended a lengthy, thorough, and accurate memorandum 
summarizing the state of class action doctrine in early 1962 to his first draft of the revised Rule 23. 
His revised rule, however, did not distinguish between injunctive relief and money damages class 
suits at all, nor did it provide for opt-out rights. See Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin 
Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions 
Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, at EE-1 to EE-2, EE-5 to EE-6 (May 28–30, 1962), microformed 
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* * * 
Although the proposed solutions to the Rule 23 puzzle differ, a situation 
that itself gestures to the value of a historical inquiry into its answer, they 
share one important trait. Each fits the idea that a trans-substantive rationale 
rooted in some account of interest representation provides class-wide res 
judicata with its normative foundation. If notice and opt-out rights are 
procedural safeguards of adequacy, a class‘s intrinsic harmony renders them 
unnecessary to support the due process bona fides of an injunctive relief 
judgment. The pragmatic justifications cite to generic, recurring features of 
injunctive relief suits to excuse the need to guarantee adequate 
representation in the due process balance; if individuals have little 
ownership interest in injunctive relief claims, then the need to guarantee 
interest representation is correspondingly weak. The history of class action 
doctrine between 1938 and 1966, which I turn to next, suggests that this 
trans-substantive assumption about Rule 23‘s normative foundation is not 
entirely correct. On the contrary, at least part of the rule‘s development was 
highly substance-specific.  
II.  EARLY CLASS SUITS AND THE PRECLUSION PROBLEM 
If the modern class action and the preclusion it generates are striking 
exceptions to the individual day-in-court ideal, then the injunctive relief suit 
is particularly extreme. Notice and opt-out rights, after all, preserve at least a 
modicum of individual control over the right to sue in money damages 
cases. When the 1966 authors rewrote the law of class actions, they must 
have had some reason to believe that a class action could lawfully bind 
absent class members without their consent or participation. Statutory 
restrictions on their power meant that these rulemakers could not themselves 
remake preclusion law.
71
 This Part and the next thus explain where the 
                                                                                                                       
on CI-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). If this rule were an attempt to codify existing 
threads of class action doctrine, or translate it into modern terms, it evinces little appreciation of the 
distinctions Bone makes. 
 This document and several others do not explicitly list Kaplan as their authors. They clearly were 
the sort written by the committee‘s reporter, and so it is appropriate to attribute authorship to Kaplan. 
Also, Bone notes that, to the 1966 authors, the need for notice and opt-out rights hinged on the 
―‗homogeneity and ―solidarity‖ of the class.‘‖ Bone, supra note 13, at 297. ―Although it is not 
entirely clear,‖ he writes, ―I believe that when Committee members looked for ‗homogeneity‘ and 
‗solidarity,‘ they thought in terms of whether the adjudication focused on the impersonal class as an 
aggregate or on class members as individuals, rather than in terms of whether the substantive goals of 
class members were likely to diverge or converge . . . .‖ Id. Kaplan‘s memorandum, however, 
suggests that solidarity or homogeneity existed when class member preferences were aligned. 
Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, at EE-22 (May 28–30, 
1962), microformed on CI-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (noting that ―solidarity‖ 
exists when ―it is less likely that there will be dissension‖ or ―sizeable discord‖ among class 
members); id. at EE-24 (speculating as to a divergence of class member preferences as a reason why 
the Court found inadequate representation in Hansberry v. Lee). For further discussion of Hansberry 
v. Lee, see infra note 100. 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); see also Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/4
2011] DESEGREGATION LITIGATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 671 
 
broadly preclusive class judgment came from before the 1966 authors began 
their labors.  
This evolution had two stages, the first of which I describe in this Part. 
Fairly soon after Rule 23‘s initial promulgation in 1938,72 an anachronistic 
rights-based formalism yielded to a functional inquiry into interest 
representation as the normative basis for preclusion in class actions. This 
shift could have licensed res judicata for absent class members in a much 
wider array of suits than what the authors of the 1938 rule contemplated. 
But federal courts prohibited class suits that might produce binding 
judgments to go forward anytime class members might have conflicting 
preferences for what to do with their rights to sue, provided that these 
preferences were legally relevant. The quite narrow limits on class-wide 
preclusion envisioned in 1938 persisted, albeit in modern guise. This general 
course of class action doctrine makes all the more interesting the second 
stage: the emergence of a class action that could generate class-wide 
preclusion, despite conflicting litigant preferences, in desegregation 
litigation in the early 1960s. This history comes in Part III.  
A.  The First Rule 23 and Rights-Based Formalism in Preclusion 
Doctrine 
 The authors of the first Rule 23 organized types of class suits around 
19th Century understandings of rights and their ownership. The rule derived 
much of its original formulation from a 1937 article by Professor James 
William Moore.
73
 Moore identified three categories of class actions based 
on the so-called jural relationships among class members.
74
 Rule 23(a)(1) 
provided for the ―true‖ class action, or a case in which the ―character of the 
right sought to be enforced . . . is . . . joint or common, or secondary.‖75 As 
Professor Bone describes them, such rights were ―impersonal‖; any 
particular plaintiff possessed them solely because of his undifferentiated 
status or membership in a particular group.
76
 Members who sued on behalf 
                                                                                                                       
497, 503 (2001); Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of Rules Committee 
Meetings 117 (May 18, 1953), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd  
Policies/rules/Minutes/CV05-1953-min-Vol1.pdf. 
 72. A story of Rule 23‘s evolution that begins in the mid-1930s, with the drafting of the 
original class action rule, does so somewhat arbitrarily. The 1938 authors claimed merely to restate 
existing equity practice. AM. BAR ASS‘N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 66 (Edward H. 
Hammond ed., 1939) [hereinafter WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS]. 
 73. James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the 
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 app. at 137–43 (including 
various versions of Rule 23 and proposed revisions 1938–1966); see also WASHINGTON 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 72, at 66 (statement by Professor and committee reporter Charles Clark 
crediting Moore). 
 74. James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 309–10 
(1937); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 246 (1950) (discussing Moore‘s 
terminology). 
 75. Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 309. 
 76. Bone, supra note 13, at 274–78. 
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of an unincorporated association vindicated ―joint‖ rights.77 The 
association‘s interest was really at stake, and when states allowed suit in the 
association‘s trade name, Rule 23(a)(1) was unnecessary.78 The stockholder 
derivative suit involved derivative or ―‗[s]econdary‘‖ rights.79 The 
stockholder had no individual right but rather enforced the corporation‘s 
cause of action.
80
 ―[C]ommon‖ rights were those class members held 
together.
81
 Rule 23(a)(3) in contrast provided for ―spurious‖ class suits.82 
These involved ―several‖ rights and required ―a common question of law or 
fact‖ and that class members seek ―common relief.‖83 All class members 
personally owned their rights, which were similar but otherwise jurally 
independent.
84
 
Unlike the current Rule 23, the rights-based organization of the 1938 
version had nothing to do with remedies. A plaintiff could bring a spurious 
class suit either for damages or an injunction. The requirement that the class 
seek ―common relief‖ meant that all class members had to benefit from the 
same type of relief, or from relief emanating from a single source.
85
  
This rights-based organization should have struck the pragmatically 
minded members of the original Advisory Committee as a formalistic 
anachronism.
86
 In Professor Zechariah Chafee‘s words, Rule 23 ―force[d] 
                                                                                                                       
 77. Hiram H. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 40–41 (1937); 
Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 314. 
 78. Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 314. 
 79. Lesar, supra note 77, at 43; Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 315. 
 80. Chester B. McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEO. L.J. 878, 898–99 
(1938); Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 315. 
 81. Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 316. 
 82. Rule 23(a)(2) created the ―hybrid‖ class action. This category had little practical importance 
and was mostly obsolete by 1938. See 2 WILLIAM W. BARRON ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, WITH FORMS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 562.3, at 275 (2d ed. 1961); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.04, at 2239 (1938). 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938). 
 84. For example, a group of employees, each of whom was employed pursuant to a separate 
contract, had several rights. One employee could sue to vindicate her several right to overtime 
compensation and by no means had to tie herself to other similarly situated employees. E.g., Pentland 
v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).  
 85.  Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1952); McGrath v. Abo, 186 
F.2d 766, 769–70 (9th Cir. 1951); Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108, 113 n.17 (D.S.C. 1966); see also 
Irving A. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 ILL. 
L. REV. 518, 521 (1947); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of 
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 701 n.45 (1941). The Eighth Circuit disagreed. Farmers Co-Op. 
Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101, 105 (8th Cir. 1942); see also James A. Rahl, The 
Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 
127, 133 (1942). In a memorandum to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee written in May 1962, 
Benjamin Kaplan declared that the Eighth Circuit‘s approach ―is clearly not the prevailing law.‖ 
Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Action—Rule 23, at EE-43 (May 28–30, 
1962), microformed on CIS-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 86. E.g., CHAFEE, supra note 74, at 245 (denouncing Rule 23‘s classifications based on 
―outworn categories of rights‖). 
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judges to decide cases by choosing labels, and not by reasoning the thing 
out,‖87 and it proved maddeningly difficult to apply in practice.88 
Nonetheless, this rights-based formalism had significant real-world 
implications, chiefly because it dictated the preclusive effect of a class 
judgment.
89
 True class suits bound absent class members;
90
 because Rule 23 
did not provide for opt-out rights, these suits were thus mandatory. Spurious 
suits generated res judicata only for named plaintiffs and class members 
who affirmatively intervened.
91
 The Rules Enabling Act‘s ―substantive 
rights‖ limitation prevented Moore‘s proposal that the original Rule 23 
codify this preclusion doctrine, but it nonetheless prevailed in practice.
92
  
On one level, the link between preclusion and jural relationships made 
sense. The 1938 authors labored before the notion of interest representation 
as a constitutional justification for binding individuals to judgments 
obtained without their consent or participation had fully coalesced.
93
 No 
doctrinal basis existed to extend the preclusive force of a class judgment to 
deny plaintiffs in spurious suits—that is, plaintiffs with ―several‖ rights at 
stake—control over the disposition of their individually owned rights to sue.  
The res judicata consequences of this rights-based formalism, however, 
drew nearly uniform criticism in the era‘s commentary.94 Among other ills, 
it made Rule 23(a)(3)‘s spurious class suit provision nearly pointless.95 
                                                                                                                       
 87. Id. at 257; see also Arthur John Keefe et al., Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 
334 (1948) (criticizing the ―unthinking formalism‖ of Rule 23). 
 88. E.g., Sys. Fed‘n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1950); DAVID W. LOUISELL & 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 723 (1962); Arthur John 
Keefe, Federal Rules—Proposed Amendment: Two Comments, 41 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (1955). 
 89. See Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1952) (Clark, J.) (complaining that, 
―The convenient use of the appellations ‗true,‘ ‗hybrid,‘ and ‗spurious‘ for determining the effect of a 
judgment in a class suit under F.R. 23(a) has become rather general . . . .‖); 2 MOORE ET AL., supra 
note 82,  at 2283–95. 
 90. E.g., Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 91. E.g., Albrecht v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & 
L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870, 874–75 (W.D. Pa. 1947). But see Nat‘l Hairdressers‘ & Cosmetologists‘ 
Ass‘n, Inc. v. Philad Co., 41 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D. Del. 1941). See generally Pa. R.R. v. United 
States, 111 F. Supp. 80, 90–91 (D.N.J. 1953). 
 92. Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 556; cf. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Proceedings of Meeting 48 (Feb. 1–4, 1937), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/US 
Courts/Rulesandpolicies/rules/minutes/cv02-1937-min.pdf (describing Professor George Wharton 
Pepper‘s motion that ―the rules have no statement by us . . . respecting the effect of the judgment‖). 
 93. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the ―Day in Court‖ Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 193, 214–15 (1992). Moore rejected the idea that preclusion should depend on interest 
representation as ―relegating the entire doctrine to the haphazardous concept of ‗fireside equity.‘‖ 
Moore & Cohn, supra note 74, at 563. He did acknowledge that ―[o]f course the representatives of a 
joint, common or derivative right must not be negligent or incompetent if the decree is to bind the 
entire class.‖ Id. at 559; see also Bone, supra, at 213 n.64 (1992); Hazard et al., supra note 13, at 
1941.  
 94. E.g., CHAFEE, supra note 74, at 251–58; Keefe et al., supra note 87, at 334–38. 
 95. Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 
825 (1946); see also Note, Classifications Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules, 2 HOW. L.J. 111, 118 
(1956). 
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Since only absent class members who consented were bound, the spurious 
class action promised little beyond that which permissive joinder under Rule 
20 could accomplish
96
 and, in Professor Charles Alan Wright‘s words, was 
―not really a class action at all.‖97 A district court in 1942 rightly recognized 
the implication of this enfeebled preclusive effect: the decision to let a case 
proceed as a spurious class action was not one of ―any consequence.‖98  
B.  Interest Representation and Restrictive Preclusion 
The tenor of the times in the late 1930s and early 1940s all but 
guaranteed a shift in the normative foundation for class-wide preclusion. 
The rights-based formalism Rule 23 codified proved irksome to lawyers of a 
realist generation.
99
 Also, just as Rule 23 went into force, interest 
representation as a basis for nonparty or absent class member preclusion, a 
doctrine much more attuned to actual characteristics and preferences of 
litigants, had begun to solidify.
100
 
                                                                                                                       
 96. WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 72, at 67 (including comments of Charles Clark, 
suggesting that Rule 23(a)(3) offered ―merely a short cut to cases where joinder is permissive‖); 2 
BARRON ET AL., supra note 82, § 562.3, at 275; CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE 
PLEADING § 63, at 406 (2d ed. 1947); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 85, at 705 (arguing that Rule 
23(a)(3) ―simply duplicates a task already performed by another section of the rules‖). Rule 23(a)(3) 
promised a mild jurisdictional benefit in diversity suits. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete 
diversity among all the parties. Under Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365–66 
(1921), only the citizenship of the class representatives mattered for diversity purposes. See Moreschi 
v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613, 617 (W.D. Pa. 1939). Hence, the only concrete advantage of the 
spurious class suit over joinder of litigants through other rules was its jurisdictional effect. E.g., 
Shipley, 70 F. Supp. at 874; Hunter v. S. Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243–44 (E.D. 
Ky. 1942).  
 97. Charles Alan Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate 
Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 337 (1964). 
 98. Hunter, 47 F. Supp. at 244. 
 99. E.g., Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1959) (Clark, J.); Keefe et al., supra note 
87, at 342; Charles Alan Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing 
Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521, 540 (1954). 
 100. Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1952) (Clark, J.); Battles v. Braniff 
Airways, 146 F.2d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1945); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 91 (7th Cir. 
1941); CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 63, at 278 (1928); Note, 
Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1954); Note, Developments in the 
Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 936–38 (1958). 
The confused treatment of res judicata in the 1940 Hansberry v. Lee decision perhaps best 
reflects this doctrinal flux. The issue in Hansberry was whether a judgment in an earlier case brought 
by a class of homeowners approving a racially restrictive covenant precluded a black homeowner, 
nominally a member of the earlier class, from challenging the covenant‘s validity in a second lawsuit. 
The Court began its analysis with adequate representation doctrine, noting that due process requires 
―the protection of the interests of absent parties‖ before res judicata can attach to a class judgment, 
and that preclusion is only appropriate when absent parties ―are in fact adequately represented by 
parties who are present . . . .‖ Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940). But, citing 19th Century 
authority, the Court then concluded that a class representative could not adequately represent absent 
class members‘ interests when, in contrast with class members who have ―a sole and common 
interest,‖ class members ―are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them.‖ Id. at 44–
18
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The 1938 version of Rule 23 required a showing of adequate 
representation before a class suit could proceed.
101
 The emergence of 
interest representation as a constitutional foundation for preclusion thus 
opened the possibility that once a court permitted a case to proceed as a 
class action, its judgment, regardless of the nature of the right, could bind 
absent class members.
102
 The decision to allow a case to proceed as a class 
suit took on increasing importance. But courts generally disallowed the 
dramatic empowerment of Rule 23 that this normative shift otherwise 
promised. They mostly found the requisite adequacy only in true class suits, 
in effect justifying in new terms the crabbed class action preclusion doctrine 
that developed under the old rights-based formalism. When an absent class 
member might have a different preference for what to do with her right to 
sue—an ever-present possibility—a class representative could not 
adequately represent her and procure a judgment on her behalf.
103
 In true 
                                                                                                                       
45. This language refers to several rights and implies that when class members have such rights, 
adequate representation is not possible. For a similar reading of Hansberry, see Bone, supra note 93, 
at 215–16 n.73. 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938). 
 102. See Giordano v. Radio Corp. of Am., 183 F.2d 558, 560–61 (3d Cir. 1950) (refusing to 
describe a class action as true because of inadequate representation and suggesting that the res 
judicata force of the class judgment made the determination an important one); Weeks, 125 F.2d at 93 
(―In making the decision as to plaintiffs‘ ability to insure an adequate representation of all the 
members of the class, we have created a test, by stating the proposition in the reverse: Now assuming, 
as we do, that this is a proper class suit, then those of the class who are not plaintiffs will be bound by 
the judgment. That being the case, should this court permit the plaintiffs, on the showing before us, to 
bind the absent plaintiffs of this class, ‗for better or for worse‘?‖); cf. Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & 
Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944) (declaring that a ―stricter rule as to the adequacy of 
representation‖ would apply in order to bind class members who do not intervene than the rule that 
would apply to bind those who do intervene). 
103. Giordano, 183 F.2d at 561; Ky. Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d 797, 802 (6th 
Cir. 1951); United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 101 (N.D. Ill. 1952) 
(requiring that, ―A representative . . . have an interest co-extensive and wholly compatible with the 
interest of those whom he would represent so as to insure fairly the adequate representation of all.‖). 
The 1942 Restatement of Judgments, for example, acknowledged that ―Due process . . . means only 
that the interests of a person should be adequately represented,‖ but it limited its assertion that class 
judgments precluded further litigation ―only . . . to persons whose situation with reference to the 
matter involved in the suit is substantially identical with that of the person who represents them.‖ An 
identity of interests only existed when the ―right or liability . . . is common to the class‖—that is, 
when the suit involved the sort of rights that made it a true one. AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS § 86 cmt. b, cmt. f (1942). Some commentators argued that ―it is clear that 100% 
agreement is not required‖ for a case, including a spurious suit, to enjoy the requisite adequacy. 2 
BARRON ET AL. supra note 82, § 567, at 309; see also Joseph J. Simeone, Procedural Problems of 
Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 905, 913 (1962); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some 
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 460 (1960); Comment, Denial of Due Process 
Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX. L. REV. 64, 72 (1946); Note, Representative Actions—The 
Status of Rule 23(a)(3), 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 191, 194 (1949). These commentators cited true suits 
for this claim, not spurious ones. See Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944) 
(cited in Federal Practice and Procedure, 2 BARRON ET AL., supra note 82, § 567, at 309, in Denial 
of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, Representative Actions—The Status of Rule 
23(a)(3), and in Simeone‘s Procedural Problems of Class Suits); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 
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suits, the group ownership of rights to sue made individual litigant 
preferences irrelevant,
104
 but individual ownership of several rights made 
the picture different in spurious cases. Thus, as Charles Clark, then on the 
Second Circuit, commented in 1947, ―truly adequate representation would 
be hard to attain‖ in a spurious class action.105 
In keeping with the pragmatic spirit of the day, courts did not merely 
invoke the several nature of the right at stake but also offered various 
functional reasons for why class representatives in spurious suits invariably 
failed the adequacy test. A class representative‘s failure to ―suppl[y] some 
proof that others in the class desired [the] suit to go on and 
that . . . few . . . members of the class were opposed to [its] prosecution,‖ for 
example, meant a finding of inadequate representation of interests.
106
 
Speculation, often with no basis in the record, that class members might 
have conflicting interests also justified a refusal to let a case proceed as a 
class action.
107
 The number of class representatives in comparison to the 
size of the class proved a key determinant of adequacy during these years,
108
 
in significant measure because a small number of class representatives 
relative to the size of the class justified speculation as to a divergence of 
preferences.
109
 Courts also invoked divergent litigant characteristics to reject 
class treatment, not because they created the sort of manageability concerns 
that might matter to present-day class certification inquiry, but because 
divergent litigant characteristics meant a higher likelihood of divergent 
litigant preferences. Thus, differences in the relationships individual class 
members had with the defendant or the nature or manner of their injuries 
tipped the adequacy calculus against class treatment.
110
    
Class suits to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 
nicely illustrate the judicial reluctance to extend preclusion in class actions 
in the 1940s, despite the normative shift to interest representation. FLSA, 
which established a minimum wage for many industries and required 
                                                                                                                       
F.R.D. 64, 77 (D. Conn. 1958) (cited in Simeone‘s Procedural Problems of Class Suits). 
 104. Cf. Redmond, 144 F.2d at 151–52 (determining in a true class suit that, ―The possible 
situation that the beneficiaries may have divergent views as to their several undivided rights . . . does 
not prevent this being a class action.‖). 
 105. CLARK, supra note 96, § 63, at 406. 
 106. Weeks, 125 F.2d at 94; see also Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 
1948) (declaring that adequacy depends in part on whether ―members desire . . . such 
representation‖). 
 107. E.g., Ky. Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 190 F.2d at 802; Weeks, 125 F.2d at 93 (speculating as 
to possible conflicts of interest among class members); Conner v. Pa. R.R., 11 F.R.D. 112, 113 
(D.D.C. 1950); cf. McQuillen v. Nat‘l Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867, 873 (D. Md. 1938) 
(applying Equity Rule 38, Rule 23‘s predecessor).  
 108. 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 82, § 23.03, at 2234–35; see also United Pub. Workers of Am. 
v. Local No. 312, 94 F. Supp. 538, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Knowles, 171 F.2d at 19; Pac. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. La. 1942). 
 109. Weeks, 125 F.2d at 91–92; Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 
F.2d 979, 984 (3d Cir. 1941). 
 110. Weeks, 125 F.2d at 93; see also Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 30 F. Supp. 173, 176 
(S.D. Ill. 1939). 
20
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payment for overtime work, had its own class action provision. Section 
16(b) of the statute authorized employees to sue ―for and in behalf 
of . . . [any] other employees similarly situated.‖111 Although courts 
described claims for unpaid wages or overtime as involving several rights,
112
 
FLSA‘s statutory class suit provision prevented rote reference to the 
true/spurious distinction in Rule 23 to determine a judgment‘s preclusive 
effect.
113
 Indeed, whether § 16(b) arguably provided statutory license for 
judgments binding on absent class members remained an open question for 
a few years after its enactment.
114
  
Almost without exception, however, courts refused to invest FLSA class 
judgments with such force.
115
 The possibility that class members might have 
different preferences for the vindication of FLSA rights, several as they 
were, made adequate representation impossible.
116
 Divergent litigant 
characteristics indicated different and possibly conflicting interests. Hence 
differences in numbers of hours worked or types of job classification 
justified a refusal to find adequate representation and permit a suit to 
proceed as a class action.
117
   
* * * 
The shift to interest representation as a basis for nonparty preclusion 
made mandatory class treatment, regardless of the nature of the right, 
theoretically possible. But courts set a high bar for the requisite harmony of 
class member interests necessary to support a finding of adequate 
representation. A showing of 100% agreement was mostly impossible. 
Preclusion for the class was unlikely except in true suits, where class 
member preferences were legally irrelevant. In effect, the rights-based 
formalism that besmirched the 1938 version of Rule 23 remained in the 
                                                                                                                       
 111. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069, 1069. 
 112. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852–53 (3d Cir. 1945); Saxton v. W. S. Askew 
Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, 521 (N.D. Ga. 1940). 
 113. Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (noting that § 16(b) 
rendered the question of whether a suit is true or spurious ―academic‖). 
 114. E.g., Tolliver v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1941) (avoiding 
this question but setting up a procedure whereby a judgment might afford preclusion in favor of 
absent class members); Recent Cases, Labor Law—Fair Labor Standards Act—FLSA Class Action 
Limited to Employees Giving Assent, 55 HARV. L. REV. 668, 688–89 (1942).  With the Portal-to-
Portal Act in 1947, Congress explicitly required that class members opt in to a FLSA class action. 
E.g., Note, Fair Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 352, 360 (1948).  
 115. E.g., Pentland, 4 F.R.D. at 352; Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435, 437 (D.N.J. 1944); 
Shain, 40 F. Supp. at 490; Brooks v. S. Dairies, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 588, 588 (S.D. Fla. 1941); Albert B. 
Gerber & S. Harry Galfand, Employees‘ Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 
505, 509 (1947). But see Cissell v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 37 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Ky. 1941).  
 116. Shain, 40 F. Supp. at 490 (finding adequate representation and thus res judicata impossible 
―where different members of a class are free to either assert rights or to challenge them as their 
individual judgments dictate‖). 
 117. Smith v. Stark Trucking, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 826, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1943); Fink v. Oliver Iron 
Mining Co., 65 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D. Minn. 1941); Lofther v. First Nat‗l Bank of Chicago, 45 F. 
Supp. 986, 988–89 (N.D. Ill. 1941); Saxton, 35 F. Supp. at 521. 
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general course of class action doctrine. As a result, the class action had little 
of the regulatory force it has today.
118
 
III.  DESEGREGATION LITIGATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
MANDATORY CLASS SUIT 
Class action doctrine remained in this enfeebled state until 1966, except 
in one substantive area.
119
 The so-called ―race relations‖ class actions that 
civil rights advocates brought under Rule 23, beginning in the late 1930s, 
mostly involved several rights and were thus spurious suits.
120
 But from the 
earliest days of this litigation under Rule 23, these suits generated 
dispositions that bound and benefited absent class members.
121
 This res 
judicata force meant that the key question in these cases was whether to 
allow them to proceed as class actions, a question that often boiled down to 
whether the class representative afforded adequate representation. By the 
mid-1960s, some southern federal courts permitted them to do so, even 
when individual litigant preferences as to the proper desegregation remedy 
may have conflicted quite fundamentally. The doctrine developed in these 
cases ultimately supported a much invigorated Rule 23.  
I describe the emergence of this desegregation exception to the general 
course of mid-century class action doctrine in this Part. It occurred over 
three periods. The first encompassed the years right before Brown v. Board 
of Education, when black plaintiffs made significant but gradual strides 
toward equality. Courts took a modest step forward by letting class suits 
proceed despite the theoretical possibility of conflicting litigant interests, 
when in practical terms these conflicts were highly unlikely. The second 
period included the five or so years after Brown, when federal courts were 
                                                                                                                       
 118. See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 85 (regretting that Rule 23‘s limitations 
undercut the regulatory potential of class actions). 
 119. See 2 BARRON ET AL., supra note 82, § 572, at 347 (noting in the 1961 edition, the 
consensus among federal courts that this approach to res judicata was correct); id. § 562.1, at 268–71 
(describing desegregation class suits as an anomaly). 
 120. Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 1962); Evans v. Buchanan, 256 F.2d 688, 
690 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1958); see also Class Actions: A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. 
L. REP. 991, 1001 (1956). 
121. E.g., United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 865 n.62 (5th Cir. 1966); 
Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 590–91 (5th Cir. 1965); Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 
116, 117–18 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Memorandum Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and for 
Respondents in No. 5 on Further Reargument with Respect to the Effect of the Court‘s Decree, 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5), 1954 WL 45731, at *5–
10; Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 935–36; Paul Hartman, The Right to Equal 
Educational Opportunities as a Personal and Present Right, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 424, 430 (1963); 
Robert B. McKay, ―With All Deliberate Speed‖: A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 991, 1085 (1956); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 647 
(1965); Note, State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation: Private Schools, Pupil Placement, and 
Geographic Segregation, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 354, 362 (1959); Comment, The Class Action Device in 
Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 577, 578 (1953); cf. Sys. Fed‘n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 
991, 996–97 (6th Cir. 1950); LOUISELL & HAZARD, supra note 88, at 718–19 (discussing Reed); The 
Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, supra, at 590–91 (discussing Reed).  
22
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hardly immune to the backlash the decision provoked. Class action doctrine 
stagnated. Southern state legislatures restructured discriminatory practices in 
a manner that emphasized class members‘ different characteristics, and 
reluctant or defiant federal courts denied class treatment because the several 
nature of the right at stake made litigant preferences relevant and their 
conflict theoretically possible. Class action doctrine again progressed in the 
early 1960s, the third period of this evolution, at a time when a cadre of 
federal judges refused to countenance southern foot-dragging any longer.
122
 
Despite fundamental conflicts among black students as to the wisdom of 
school integration, courts allowed plaintiffs to prosecute class suits and 
obtain judgments that bound all absent class members.
123
 The success of 
class allegations in the desegregation litigation of this third period did not 
hinge upon some theoretical, trans-substantive development that justified 
less concern for individual litigant preferences in the interest representation 
calculus. Rather, judges appear to have let these cases proceed as class suits 
because, given circumstances in the early 1960s, desegregation plaintiffs 
needed class treatment of their claims to have a hope of dismantling Jim 
Crow through litigation.  
A.  Rule 23‘s Importance to Desegregation Litigation 
The significance of desegregation litigation to the evolution of class 
action doctrine begs a fundamental question: Why did black plaintiffs bring 
desegregation cases as class suits? Couldn‘t a single black plaintiff in an 
individual action, for example, have obtained a broadly sweeping injunction 
requiring an integrated school?
124
  
The answer lies in the several key advantages Rule 23 promised to civil 
rights plaintiffs.
125
 A class action avoided the sort of mootness problems 
that, for example, an individual plaintiff‘s graduation might create.126 
Individual actions at least nominally triggered judgments only named parties 
                                                                                                                       
 122. In addition to this growing impatience, the greater success black litigants enjoyed might 
reflect that the passage of time meant more of their cases were decided at the appellate level. Circuit 
judges were considerably more sympathetic to black plaintiffs during this time than were their district 
court colleagues. See Kenneth N. Vines, The Role of Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial 
Process: A Case Study, 7 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 305, 310 (1963). 
 123. Id.  
 124. 2 BARRON ET AL., supra note 82, § 562.1, at 270; John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class 
Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1433 (2003); see also YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 260–
61. 
125. See generally Keith Jurow, School Desegregation, Class Suits, and the Vexing Problem of 
Group Remedies, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 27–28 (1977). 
 126. Compare McSwain v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ. of Anderson Cnty., Tenn., 138 F. Supp. 570, 571 
(E.D. Tenn. 1956), and Buckner v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Greene Cnty., Va., 332 F.2d 452, 453–54 (4th 
Cir. 1964), with Becton v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.R.D. 220, 221–22 (E.D.N.C. 1963), and 
Hart v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty., 164 F. Supp. 501, 503 (D. Md. 1958); see also McKay, supra 
note 121, at 1085; Recent Cases, Negro Plaintiffs Already Admitted to White School May Maintain 
Suit for Injunction Against Segregated School System, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669 (1965); The 
Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, supra note 121, at 578–80. 
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could execute;
127
 because a desegregation class judgment benefited absent 
class members, in contrast, the pool of potential enforcers was much 
larger.
128
 
Most importantly, until 1963, when the Fifth Circuit decided the 
important case of Potts v. Flax,
129
 courts doubted that they could issue 
broadly applicable injunctions in individual actions.
130
 Those judges with 
segregationist tendencies stressed the fact that the plaintiff had only brought 
an individual action to justify the remarkably grudging relief Brown forced 
them to order.
131
 A district judge in 1962, for example, warned a student 
challenging Clemson University‘s all-white admissions policy that because 
he did not bring a class action, he could win no more than the right to attend 
the school as its sole black matriculant.
132
 A stalwart opponent of 
desegregation refused to permit a challenge to transportation segregation to 
proceed as a class suit and suggested that the three named plaintiffs alone 
could obtain an injunction to allow just them to travel on otherwise all-white 
buses.
133
 A student-by-student approach to desegregation litigation posed 
enormous difficulties and all but nullified Brown.
134
 To those invested in the 
                                                                                                                       
 127. McKay, supra note 121, at 1085.  
 128. Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 935. 
 129. 313 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1963); see also FISS, supra note 44, at 484–86. 
 130. Holland v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., 258 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 
1958) (asking for additional briefing on the question of whether ―there [are] any precedents for 
ordering general desegregation of the public schools, or for granting relief to a segregated class in 
cases which were not filed as class actions,‖ and claiming to be ―in some doubt‖ as to the answer to 
the question); see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of 
Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2185–86 & n.32 (1989).  
 131. E.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting) 
(quoting district court order declaring that three individuals have right to unsegregated service from a 
restaurant but refusing a class wide injunction for the same); Jeffers v. Whitley, 197 F. Supp. 84, 93–
94 (M.D.N.C. 1961) (dismissing class allegations, allowing individuals to replead to seek injunctions 
for themselves). 
 132. S. C. Anderson, Negro is Warned in Clemson Case: Judge Says Suit for Entry May Not Set 
a Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1962, at 26. 
 133. Bailey, 206 F. Supp. at 69–70. Sidney Mize, the district judge involved, ―fit the mold of 
southern federal judges who were bent on resistance‖ to desegregation. Fred L. Banks, Jr., The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Personal Perspective, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 275, 278 
n.15 (1996); see also FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL 
INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 211–22 (1978). 
 134. Cf. Robert A. LeFlar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools—1953, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 377, 422 (1954) (discussing some of these issues and why the class action remediated 
them). It meant that the success of desegregation depended on the willingness of individual black 
plaintiffs to come forward. Civil rights lawyers had a hard time finding suitable plaintiffs willing to 
subject themselves to the unpleasant consequences of challenging Jim Crow in the Deep South, so 
injunctions issued on a one-by-one basis could hardly dent segregation. Mark Tushnet, Some 
Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 1697 (2004). Relatedly, it meant that 
without Rule 23, civil rights lawyers would have to bring similar litigation repeatedly, a challenge for 
cash-strapped organizations. Third, it meant that, if successful, a plaintiff would find him- or herself 
the sole black student in an all-white school—hardly a pleasant prospect for the student, and hardly 
meaningful integration. 
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success of litigation-driven desegregation, class treatment of claims seemed 
essential.
135
  
B.  The Procedural Evolution of the Desegregation Class Suit 
1.  The Pre-Brown Years 
A group of black schoolteachers and principals seeking equal rates of 
pay brought a suit in Florida that, in 1941, generated the first published class 
action decision under Rule 23 in a civil rights case.
136
 This case was 
somewhat anomalous, and other than true class suits challenging racism in 
unions, civil rights litigation before Brown amounted to a fairly small part of 
the federal courts‘ class action docket. Most of these early cases were 
brought either to desegregate higher education or to equalize teacher pay.
137
 
Some stand out because they met with success as a procedural matter, 
whereas similar spurious suits in other doctrinal areas might have failed on 
adequacy grounds. 
Most of the pre-Brown suits that enjoyed class treatment challenged 
across-the-board, de jure policies of segregation.
138
 The sole litigant 
characteristic to matter substantively was skin color, something all class 
members shared identically. The irrelevance of other, more individual 
litigant characteristics to plaintiffs‘ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
facilitated the prosecution of these cases as class suits. When defendants did 
not have such blanket policies, in contrast, the possibility that litigant 
characteristics might diverge imperiled class allegations.
139
 
Individual litigant preferences were theoretically relevant, even in cases 
challenging de jure, blanket policies because formally Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were several. But courts tended not to let abstract jural 
relationships alone hamstring class suits, taking a more realistic view of 
                                                                                                                       
 135. See infra notes 279–83 and accompanying text. 
 136. McDaniel v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Escambia Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 638, 638–39 (N.D. 
Fla. 1941). The NAACP began bringing teacher pay cases in 1939. See Comment, Private Attorneys-
General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 586 n.84 (1949). 
 137. See Jeanne M. Powers & Lirio Patton, Between Mendez and Brown: Gonzales v. Sheely 
(1951) and the Legal Campaign Against Segregation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 137 (2008) 
(describing the NAACP‘s litigation strategy before Brown). 
 138. 2 BARRON ET AL., supra note 82, § 562.1, at 270–71 (surveying recent decisions and 
concluding that ―cases challenging a policy discriminatory against an entire group‖ could proceed as 
class actions while those involving ―a policy, nondiscriminatory on its face, [that] has been applied in 
a discriminatory manner to a particular individual or individuals‖ could not). 
 139. See Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580, 582 (M.D. Ala. 1945) (disallowing blacks to sue 
as a class to challenge registrars‘ refusal to register them as voters because ―whether a person is 
entitled to be registered or not is determined solely by weighing his qualifications and 
disqualifications‖ and ―cannot be determined by groups or classes but must be determined as to each 
individual‖); Turner v. Keefe, 50 F. Supp. 647, 652–53 (S.D. Fla. 1943) (holding that individualized 
assessment according to Board of Education plan defeats claim for discrimination, statistical disparity 
notwithstanding). But see Davis v. Cook, 80 F. Supp. 443, 446–47, 452 (N.D. Ga. 1948) (allowing a 
class action to go forward to challenge Atlanta‘s facially neutral system that set teacher pay on a case-
by-case basis). 
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what these suits put at issue.
140
 A Missouri district court, for example, 
refused to allow a case challenging the segregation of Kansas City parks to 
proceed as a class action.
141
 Following standard class action doctrine, the 
court, noting that the rights at stake were personal (i.e., several), insisted 
that ―the individual alone may complain that his constitutional privilege has 
been invaded.‖142 Reversing, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that, while 
―[v]iolations of the Fourteenth Amendment are of course violations of 
individual or personal rights, . . . where they are committed on a class basis 
or as a group policy, such as a discrimination generally because of race, they 
are . . . entitled to be made the subject of class actions . . . .‖143  
Courts may have worried less about conflicting class member interests 
because these suits did not implicate these interests in practical effect. The 
injunctive relief at issue either did not force absent class members to do 
anything or could not possibly have been controversial among them. Orders 
permitting blacks to use city parks,
144
 for example, or orders allowing blacks 
to attend previously all-white colleges enabled but did not require African-
Americans to engage in integrated activity.
145
 It is hard to imagine why 
                                                                                                                       
 140. E.g., Constantine v. Sw. La. Inst., 120 F. Supp. 417, 418 (W.D. La. 1954) (rejecting 
defendants‘ argument that a class action could not proceed because the rights involved were 
―personal to the individual‖).  
 141. Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848, 857 (W.D. Mo. 1952). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1953). 
 144. E.g., id.; Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769, 770, 772 (S.D. Cal. 1944). 
 145. Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ky., 83 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Ky. 1949); see also 
Wichita Falls Junior Coll. Dist. v. Battle, 204 F.2d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 1953); Tureaud v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 116 F. Supp. 248, 251 (E.D. La. 1953); Gray 
v. Univ. of Tenn., 97 F. Supp. 463, 465, 468 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Wilson v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. 
State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 92 F. Supp. 986, 988 (E.D. La. 1950). As a district court noted, 
the end to discrimination in higher education still required black students to apply individually to be 
admitted. Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C. 1955). 
 As I discuss infra Part III.C, school desegregation suits affected absent class members regardless 
of their preferences. Thurgood Marshall and his NAACP colleagues did not bring this litigation until 
1950, and when they did, they began with the five ―test‖ cases that eventually merged as Brown v. 
Board of Education. See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial 
Integration in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 322–24 (1952). 
Courts stayed other school desegregation cases pending the Court‘s decision in Brown. E.g., Bush v. 
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing procedural history of New 
Orleans school desegregation case). Prior to Marshall‘s efforts, plaintiffs in two class suits brought to 
challenge the segregation of Mexican-Americans won injunctions in federal courts requiring an end 
to segregated schools. Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D. Ariz. 1951); Mendez v. 
Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cnty., 64 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D. Cal. 1946). In neither opinion 
did the court discuss the propriety of class allegations. I could find no other published opinion or 
reference to a case in the academic literature prior to 1954 that resulted in injunctive relief that would 
have imposed a course of action on class members regardless of their preferences. Cf. LeFlar & 
Davis, supra note 134, at 378 n.2 (giving flavor of extant desegregation litigation in the country circa 
1953); id. at 388–89 n.37. 
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black teachers in suits for equal pay would have objected to an injunction 
ordering that they receive higher salaries.
146
 
These pre-Brown cases spurred an advance in class action doctrine. The 
fact that Fourteenth Amendment rights were considered to be several did not 
deter class treatment. But this step forward was modest. The cases did not 
raise the prospect of relief foisted on absent class members against their 
wishes. The doctrine they developed therefore remained roughly consistent 
with the idea that class members had to have perfectly harmonious interests 
to ensure adequate representation and thus the constitutional basis for class-
wide res judicata. 
2.  Brown‘s Immediate Wake  
Class action doctrine stagnated and arguably retreated during the first 
few years after Brown, the second period in this procedural evolution. To 
defeat desegregation litigation, most southern state legislatures replaced de 
jure policies of segregation with mechanisms that purported to treat blacks 
as individuals but invariably produced the same segregated results. These 
mechanisms made individual characteristics nominally relevant to the 
entitlement of any particular black plaintiff to relief and highlighted the 
several nature of the right at stake. As they did in other substantive areas, 
courts emphasized the theoretical possibility, rather than the practical 
likelihood, that preferences among class members might diverge, and they 
refused class treatment on these grounds. 
Judge John Parker‘s 1955 opinion in Briggs v. Elliott,147 one of the cases 
joined in Brown, laid the foundation for this southern legislative response 
and the simultaneous judicial retreat. Parker, a one-time NAACP 
adversary,
148
 and perhaps the most influential lower court judge in the 
South,
149
 minimized Brown‘s remedial force by interpreting it to mean, ―The 
Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids 
discrimination.‖150 This take provided invaluable legal cover to recalcitrant 
southern officials as they fought to maintain Jim Crow after Brown.
151
 Had 
                                                                                                                       
 146. The NAACP had hoped that the cost of providing equal salaries to black teachers would 
have made the cost of segregated public schools too high and forced states to abandon them. 
Marshall, supra note 145, at 318. But this did not happen. The litigation quite successfully equalized 
wages. Bruce Beezer, Black Teachers‘ Salaries and the Federal Courts Before Brown v. Board of 
Education: One Beginning for Equity, 55 J. NEGRO EDUC. 200, 212 (1986).  
 147. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).   
 148. Parker‘s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1930 failed in part due to opposition from the 
NAACP. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 101 (2004); Sharp Protests Hit Parker as Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1930, at 3; May 7, 1930: The Senate Rejects a Supreme Court Nominee, 
HISTORICAL MINUTE ESSAYS, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Judicial_Temp  
est.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).  
 149. Cf. Harold R. Medina, John Johnston Parker 1885–1958, 38 N.C. L. REV. 299, 303 (1959) 
(describing John Parker along with Learned Hand as, ―[T]he two men in the United States best 
qualified in every way for membership on the [Supreme] Court . . . .‖).  
 150. Briggs, 132 F. Supp. at 777. 
 151. Judge John Minor Wisdom called Briggs ―[t]he principal legal obstacle southern courts had 
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Brown required integration, states would have had to treat blacks as 
indistinguishable members of groups, nameless percentages whose mixture 
into white populations would determine whether a state or local government 
met its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. In contrast, a mathematical 
possibility, however slight, existed that the one-by-one, wholly 
nondiscriminatory assignment of students to schools could result in perfect 
segregation. The existence of such segregation proved nothing—at least 
according to the story southern state legislatures told—and discrimination in 
any particular assignment would require a plaintiff-by-plaintiff 
determination. 
Encouraged at least in part by Briggs,
152
 most southern states enacted so-
called pupil placement laws,
153
 to let local officials recreate de facto 
segregation that de jure policies had required before Brown. The more 
successful of these laws gave local school boards initial pupil assignment 
power. They would invariably send black students to black schools and 
white students to white schools.
154
 A black student dissatisfied with her 
assignment could pursue an often laborious and at times dangerous appeal to 
the school board.
155
 The board would then usually apply a host of 
considerations, facially nonracial but capacious enough to cloak 
discrimination, in order to dismiss it.
156
 The student could then challenge 
this decision in state court and, only upon exhausting state appeals, file a 
federal suit.
157
 A black plaintiff then bore the (nearly insurmountable) 
                                                                                                                       
to overcome‖ to issue effective desegregation orders. John Minor Wisdom, A Federal Judge in the 
Deep South: Random Observations, 35 S.C. L. REV. 503, 508 (1984); see also J. HARVIE WILKINSON 
III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1954–1978, at 81–82 
(1979); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., School Desegregation Problems in the South: A Historical 
Perspective, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1157, 1163 (1970).  
 152. See N.C. ADVISORY COMM. ON EDUC. ET AL., REPORT (1956), reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 581, 584 (1956); REPORT OF THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE TEXAS 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SEGREGATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 21–22, (Sept. 1, 1956), in WRIGHT 
PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 102, Folder 2. 
 153. James M. Nabrit, Jr., Legal Inventions and the Desegregation Process, 304 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 35, 36–38 (1956); Note, The Federal Courts and the Integration of Southern 
Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1452 (1962).  
 154. 2 U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EDUCATION 25 (1961). 
 155. Nabrit, supra note 153, at 38. 
 156. The Florida law, for example, had boards consider:  
 
[T]he available facilities and teaching capacity of the several schools within the 
county, the effect of the admission of new students upon established academic 
programs, the suitability of established curriculum to the students enrolled or to 
be enrolled in a given school, the scholastic appitude[sic], intelligence, mental 
energy or ability of the pupil applying for admission and the psychological, 
moral, ethical and cultural background and qualifications of the pupil applying 
for admission as compared with other pupils previously assigned to the school in 
which admission is sought. 
 
Florida Pupil Assignment Law, July 26, 1956, § 2, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 924, 925 (1956). 
 157. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
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evidentiary burden to show racial animus cloaked in the application of 
vague criteria.
158
  
Only 34 of North Carolina‘s 324,800 black students attended school 
with white children during the 1959–1960 school year,159 evidence for the 
observation in a federal report that, ―The pupil assignment acts have been 
the principal obstacle to desegregation in the South.‖ 160 The acts owed part 
of their success in this respect to their effect on class allegations. By design, 
these laws on their face did not lump black students together as 
indistinguishable members of a disfavored group. As Judge Parker 
concluded in an influential opinion affirming the constitutionality of North 
Carolina‘s pupil placement law, while black students have a right to 
admittance to schools without discrimination, ―They are admitted . . . as 
individuals, not as a class or group; and it is as individuals that their rights 
under the Constitution are asserted.‖161 This logic fit neatly with the idea 
that individuals in spurious suits controlled their own rights to sue, and that 
their preferences for what to do with these several rights required deference. 
Following Judge Parker‘s lead, several courts denied class treatment on 
grounds that individuals alone could choose when or how to vindicate their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
162
  
Individual characteristics of each black student, made nominally relevant 
to his or her claim of discriminatory school assignment by the pupil 
placement laws, also complicated adequacy determinations. The stated 
reasons why a school board denied a particular black student‘s petition to 
attend a white school varied from student to student. So too did the 
procedural posture of a particular student‘s case, given the byzantine appeals 
system each pupil placement law created. These individualized facts meant, 
as the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded in an opinion influential 
with federal judges, that a claim to challenge placement in a segregated 
school ―necessitate[s] the consideration of the application of any child or 
children individually and not en masse.‖163 No such litigation could proceed 
                                                                                                                       
COURT, 1936–1961, at 242–43 (1994); Note, Effect of School Assignment Laws on Federal 
Adjudication of Integration Controversies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 542–46 (1957). 
 158. Paul Hartman, The United States Supreme Court and Desegregation, 23 MOD. L. REV. 353, 
366 (1960); see also WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 82. 
 159. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the 
Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92, 132–33 n.186 (1994).  
 160. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SOUTHERN STATES 4 (1962); see also 
Robert J. Steamer, The Role of the Federal District Courts in the Segregation Controversy, 22 J. POL. 
417, 419 (1960). Tennessee enacted its Pupil Assignment Law in 1957, and as of March 1960, not a 
single black student had been approved for transfer to a white school. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Memphis, Tenn., 302 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1962). By 1959, Virginia had placed 450,000 students 
pursuant to its pupil placement law without letting a single black student attend an integrated school. 
Beckett v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 185 F. Supp. 459, 461 (E.D. Va. 1959).  
 161. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956). 
 162. E.g., Brunson v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon Cnty., S.C., 30 F.R.D. 369, 
372 (E.D.S.C. 1962); Jeffers v. Whitley, 197 F. Supp. 84, 91 (M.D.N.C. 1961); Aaron v. Tucker, 186 
F. Supp. 913, 930–31 (E.D. Ark. 1960). 
 163. Joyner v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795, 798 (N.C. 1956); see also 
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―collectively.‖ At most, a plaintiff could represent other students who had 
also exhausted administrative remedies and whose requests for assignment 
to integrated schools failed for identical reasons.
164
  
Not all attempts to bring desegregation class suits in the South failed in 
the period right after Brown. Black plaintiffs could group together as a class 
when the defendant retained a de jure, across-the-board policy of 
segregation.
165
 But even these sorts of suits on occasion ran aground 
procedurally, for reasons not entirely consistent with class action doctrine 
from the pre-Brown period. For example, a 1955 case to desegregate 
Louisiana State University could not proceed as a class action because the 
class representative did not show that absent class members had expressed a 
desire to be represented, even though the suit challenged an outright ban on 
black students, and even though the relief requested would simply have 
given black students an opportunity to apply.
166
 In a later opinion in the 
same case, a Fifth Circuit judge stressed that because the class 
representative did not identify any other class member who wanted to 
pursue the same course of study he could not represent all potential black 
applicants.
167
 A divergence in preferences, formally possible any time 
several rights were involved, and not the explicit, real-world manifestation 
of differences among class members, precluded class treatment. 
3.  The Early 1960s 
Some courts finally jettisoned this residue of rights-based formalism in 
desegregation decisions of the early 1960s and countenanced the sort of 
mandatory class suit that modern class action doctrine permits. Progressive 
judges reinterpreted Brown to require integration and not merely to prohibit 
discrimination—a substantive shift with important procedural ramifications. 
To implement this ―systemic integration,‖ a court would have to order 
groups of students to change schools. This relief implicated individual 
litigant preferences in a very real way. But these possibly diverging 
preferences did not prove fatal to class allegations, even as analogous ones 
would remain so for class suits in other substantive contexts. By 1966, a 
class suit could proceed and bind absent class members even if the class 
representative or class counsel pursued a remedy that would resolve their 
claims against their wishes.  
                                                                                                                       
Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780, 782 (4th Cir. 1959). 
 164. Griffith v. Bd. of Educ. of Yancey Cnty., 186 F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D.N.C. 1960). 
 165. E.g., Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1958); Sch. Bd. of the City of Newport 
News, Va. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325, 326–27 (4th Cir. 1957); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 242 
F.2d 156, 162 (5th Cir. 1957); Willie v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 202 F. Supp. 549, 554–55 (S.D. Tex. 
1962); Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C. 1955); see also 
Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REV. 
517, 543 (1959). 
 166. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Tureaud, 226 F.2d 714, 
719 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 167. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Tureaud, 228 F.2d 895, 
898–99 (5th Cir. 1956) (Cameron, J., dissenting). 
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As late as 1965, only a miniscule number of black students in the hardest 
core of the Deep South—0.43% in Alabama‘s case, for example—attended 
integrated schools.
168
 A number of the federal judges who supervised the 
great majority of desegregation suits by this point evinced considerable 
frustration with Jim Crow‘s intransigence.169 What passed for acceptable 
efforts to satisfy Brown‘s remedial dictate in the late 1950s no longer met 
judicial muster. Class action doctrine began to evolve again as courts pushed 
more aggressively for the success of desegregation. 
Divergent litigant characteristics proved less of a hurdle to class 
treatment. During this period, the patently obvious use of pupil placement 
regimes to keep schools segregated exhausted judicial patience.
170
 Courts 
excused compliance with cumbersome administrative requirements when 
the pupil placement regimes could only promise inadequate relief, such as 
decisions on transfer petitions delayed well into the school year. Black 
students also successfully argued that school boards‘ rigid practices of 
denying all applications to integrate white schools made the pursuit of relief 
through pupil placement systems futile.
171
 Proffered reasons to keep black 
students in black schools, courts recognized, merely veiled policies of 
segregation that made skin color the sole substantively relevant litigant 
characteristic to Fourteenth Amendment claims. Black students began to 
enjoy better luck with class allegations challenging these facially neutral 
regimes.
172
 
In addition to minimizing divergent litigant characteristics, class action 
doctrine that promised to bind absent parties required disregarding 
individual litigant preferences. This shift happened as the 1960s progressed. 
                                                                                                                       
 168. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND 
BORDER STATES 1965–66, at 30 (1966) (reporting also that 0.59% of black students in Mississippi 
and 0.69% of black students in Louisiana attend schools with white students in December 1965). 
 169. E.g., Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 20 (8th Cir. 1965) (―The time for delay of individual 
rights is past.‖); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 729 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(―The time has come for footdragging public school boards to move with celerity toward 
desegregation.‖); Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm‘rs of Mobile Cnty., 318 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 170. E.g., Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131, 132 (4th Cir. 1960). 
 171. The Federal Courts and the Integration of Southern Schools, supra note 153, at 1460–63. 
 172. See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191, 
196 (5th Cir. 1962); Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 1962); Bush v. Orleans Parish 
Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962); Green v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Roanoke, Va., 304 F.2d 
118, 124 (4th Cir. 1962); Flax v. Potts, 204 F. Supp. 458, 466 (N.D. Tex. 1962); Jackson v. Sch. Bd. 
of the City of Lynchburg, Va., 201 F. Supp. 620, 627 (W.D. Va. 1962); cf. Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. 
Supp. 724, 727 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (allowing class action to go forward on behalf of all black citizens 
of Alabama against Auburn University without requiring a showing that anyone other than the 
plaintiff had applied and was turned down on the basis of race). Other areas of civil rights litigation 
developed similarly. Some district courts had earlier insisted that black plaintiffs had to personally 
attempt to use segregated facilities in order to adequately represent classes of black litigants. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Kelly, 32 F.R.D. 355, 358 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 542 
(S.D. Miss. 1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 206 F. Supp. 67, 69 (S.D. Miss. 1962). Several circuits 
rejected these decisions, noting, for example, that the defendant‘s treatment of black plaintiffs would 
not vary with each attempted use of a park. Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 
1963). 
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Judicial impatience with pupil placement regimes led southern states in the 
early 1960s to try a different tactic: the so-called freedom of choice plans.
173
 
These plans provided that students could attend any school they wanted, 
subject to availability of space, and they did not create the administrative 
hurdles that school boards had used as a subterfuge to preserve segregated 
schools.
174
 They also passed muster under the Briggs interpretation of 
Brown and indeed took legal cover from Parker‘s decision.175 After an initial 
school assignment, a student could simply transfer elsewhere if he or she 
wished. Hence no discrimination. Southern state legislatures expected that 
fear and harassment of black students who tried to attend racially mixed 
schools, transportation difficulties that school districts did nothing to solve, 
and other pressures would once again yield segregation.
176
  
 Freedom of choice plans won tepid judicial approval in several southern 
courts in the early- to mid-1960s.
177
 Individual black students choosing one-
by-one to attend white schools, however, would never disassemble the 
segregation edifice. As the decade progressed, then, several circuits rejected 
Briggs and its interpretation of Brown head-on. They held that school boards 
had an affirmative obligation to achieve integrated schools by mixing 
groups of black and white students together.
178
 A freedom of choice plan 
could be nondiscriminatory—an individual black student could choose his 
school—but fail as an integration measure since real integration needed 
more than one or two intrepid black students among hundreds of white 
faces.
179
  
Because it made individual litigant characteristics substantively 
irrelevant, the shift to the systemic integration interpretation of Brown 
facilitated the prosecution of desegregation suits as class actions.
180
 But, 
                                                                                                                       
 173. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—Constitutional Law, Equal Protection, Free Choice and 
Free Transfer Plans for School Desegregation, 82 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112 (1968); see also 2 
THOMAS I. EMERSON ET AL., POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1297–98 (2d ed. 
1967). 
 174. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 168, at 12–13. 
 175. E.g., The Gen. Assembly Comm. on Sch., The Sibley Commission‘s Report on Georgia‘s 
Schools, MINDSPRING.COM (Apr. 29, 1960), http://www.mindspring.com/~sartor/gradyhs/sibley196  
0.html. 
 176. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 168, at 35–42; WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 
109–10. 
 177. E.g., Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., Ga., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th 
Cir. 1965); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 65 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 178. United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 862–66 (5th Cir. 1966); Kemp 
v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 21 (8th Cir. 1965); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 
729, 730 n.5 (5th Cir. 1965); Dowell v. Sch. Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 244 F. Supp. 971, 978–79 
(W.D. Okla. 1965). See generally George W. Gillmor & Alan L. Gosule, Note, Duty to Integrate 
Public Schools? Some Judicial Responses and a Statute, 46 B.U. L. REV. 45, 51–64 (1966). But see 
Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, Va., 345 F.2d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 1965) (rejecting this 
reinterpretation). 
 179. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 867–68 (―Acceptance of an individual‘s 
application for transfer . . . may satisfy that particular individual; it will not satisfy the class.‖).  
 180. 2 U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 154, at 24 (recognizing that the shift from 
antidiscrimination to affirmative obligation makes class actions possible because they minimize the 
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unlike in earlier class suits, in which the relief sought would have permitted 
but not forced absent class members to use integrated facilities, the relief at 
issue in a suit for integration directly implicated individual litigant 
preferences. Systemic integration required the wholesale reshuffling of 
black populations. If a case succeeded, absent class members would find 
themselves in an integrated school, whether they liked it or not. 
Many blacks, however, did not prefer this result. As civil rights lawyers 
knew well, members of black communities in the South disagreed in 
significant ways as to the appropriate remedy in desegregation litigation, and 
even as to the wisdom of that litigation itself.
181
 Fear and intimidation 
played a role, but some black families affirmatively preferred segregated 
schools for other reasons.
182
 Black teachers and principals, who were pillars 
of the southern black middle class, had much to lose with school 
desegregation,
183
 and a number of them refused to support civil rights 
lawyers‘ efforts ostensibly on behalf of them and their children.184 Some 
rural black communities benefited from the influx of funds in the 1950s 
designed to make their separate schools more ―equal,‖ and some of their 
members opposed integration for fear of its financial consequences.
185
 These 
conflicting preferences did not escape federal judicial attention.
186
 To the 
                                                                                                                       
relevance of individual circumstances).  
 181. See CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 84 (1998). These 
recollections are inconsistent with assertions about class member harmony in these cases. See 
YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 261.  
 182. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 168, at 33–35; R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of 
Desegregation: Race, Class and Education, 1935–1965, 109 AM. J. EDUCATION 320, 322 (2001); 
Vanessa Siddle Walker, Valued Segregated Schools for African American Children in the South, 
1935–1969: A Review of Common Themes and Characteristics, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 253, 254 (2000). 
 183. E.g., U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 168, at 34; REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM‘N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS 265–68 (1959); Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: Black Teachers and School 
Integration, 91 J. AM. HIST. 43, 50–51 (2004); see also MOTLEY, supra note 181, at 111; John W. 
Smith & Betty M. Smith, For Black Educators: Integration Brings the Axe, 6 URB. REV. 7 (1973); 
Preston Valien, The Status of Educational Desegregation, 1956: A Critical Summary, 25 J. NEGRO 
EDUC. 359, 364–66 (1956); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Class Actions: The Impact of Black and Middle-
Class Conservatism on Civil Rights Lawyering in a New South Political Economy, Atlanta, 1946–
1979, at 211, 237–39 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with the 
author). 
 184. E.g., Fairclough, supra note 183, at 52–53; Adam Fairclough, ―Being in the Field of 
Education and Also Being a Negro . . . Seems . . . Tragic‖: Black Teachers in the Jim Crow South, 
87 J. AM. HIST. 65, 86–87 (2000). 
 185. JEFF ROCHE, RESTRUCTURED RESISTANCE: THE SIBLEY COMMISSION AND THE POLITICS OF 
DESEGREGATION IN GEORGIA 98 (1998). 
 186. See, e.g., Brown v. Lee, 331 F.2d 142, 143 (4th Cir. 1964) (refusing to allow a class 
member in a municipal facility desegregation suit who claimed that the class plaintiffs ―did not 
represent his views‖ to intervene). In a different context, Justice John Marshall Harlan II in his 
dissent in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 462 (1963), noted that the NAACP and the plaintiffs it 
represented did not always share the same interests. Whereas the NAACP would want to take an 
unyielding stand in its litigation against segregation, clients might be willing to settle for less 
aggressive forms of integration and the like. Id. at 463 (assessing the constitutionality of Virginia‘s 
anti-barratry statute targeting the NAACP). See generally Bell, supra note 30, at 500–02 (discussing 
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contrary, defendants invoked them to argue against class treatment, on 
occasion successfully.
187
  
Judges dealt with the problem of conflicts in litigant preferences among 
class members by denying their relevance. Really at stake, they reasoned, 
were group rights, and individuals did not matter all that much. Thus, when 
defendants argued that Fourteenth Amendment rights were several and 
permitted only individuals to decide how and whether to vindicate them, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that these rights really belonged to ―Negro school 
children as a class . . . irrespective of any individual‘s right to be admitted 
on a non-racial basis to a particular school.‖188 
Judge John Minor Wisdom‘s 1966 opinion in United States v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education reflected the culmination of this reconception of 
the rights at stake, at least for the Fifth Circuit, and revealed the full 
implications of the change in substantive doctrine for the procedural 
propriety of desegregation class litigation.
189
 The harm Brown sought to 
remediate, as he saw it, targeted groups and not any particular individual. 
Judge Wisdom insisted that Parker‘s reading of Brown in Briggs reflected 
―the narrow view that Fourteenth Amendment rights are only individual 
rights,‖ a view, he noted, that made impossible ―class action suits to 
desegregate a school system.‖190 The problem with Briggs, Wisdom 
elaborated, was ―that it drain[ed] out of Brown that decision‘s significance 
as a class action to secure equal educational opportunities for Negroes by 
compelling the states to reorganize their public school systems.‖191 The 
harm of desegregation ―transcend[ed] in importance the harm to individual 
Negro children‖; a ―separate school system was an integral element in the 
Southern State‘s general program to restrict Negroes as a class‖ to their 
proper ―place.‖192 ―Adequate redress‖ of segregation, a ―group 
phenomenon,‖ ―calls for much more than allowing a few Negro children to 
attend formerly white schools.‖193 Wholesale social transformation for 
                                                                                                                       
Harlan‘s dissent).  
 187. Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1963). One particularly vehement 
segregationist on the district bench in Mississippi refused to allow black plaintiffs challenging the 
segregation of municipal facilities in Jackson to represent all black residents of the city because the 
―isolated publicity stunts‖ the plaintiffs had engaged in to have standing to sue did not, in the judge‘s 
mind, ―represent the will or desire of the 50,000 Negro citizens of Jackson.‖ Clark v. Thompson, 206 
F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D. Miss. 1962). Obviously this judge‘s extraordinary efforts to resist integration 
colored his perception of the will of Jackson‘s black population. But he nonetheless teed up the issue 
of class member preference, which the Fifth Circuit simply ignored. Clark v. Thompson, 313 F.2d 
637, 637–38 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 188. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.); see also 
Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 207 n.7 (5th Cir. 1963); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th 
Cir. 1963) (Brown, J.) (insisting that, ―The peculiar rights of specific individuals were not in 
controversy.‖). 
 189. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 190. Id. at 846 n.5. 
 191. Id. at 865. 
 192. Id. at 866. 
 193. Id.  
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classes of people is needed.
194
 An affirmative duty to integrate means that 
relief to individuals alone ―will not satisfy the class.‖195 
C.  Substantive Policy and the Mandatory Class Suit 
Because class judgments in these cases bound and benefited absent class 
members—a fact Wisdom took pains to note in Jefferson County196—they 
offered a singular pre-1966 example of an instance in which absent class 
members could have their rights adjudicated, regardless of their preferences 
and without their consent or participation. By the mid-1960s, the 
desegregation class suit was a mandatory class action, despite the formally 
several nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights. The reassignment of these 
rights from individuals to groups enabled the desegregation class suit to 
surmount the litigant preferences obstacle that thwarted class allegations in 
other areas.  
Arguably, courts just redefined Fourteenth Amendment rights as ―joint, 
common, or secondary‖ and thus as candidates for true class suits. But by 
the 1960s, a rationale rooted in some conception about the inherent nature of 
rights would have been wildly anachronistic. A more pragmatic explanation 
was in order. The Equal Protection Clause required systemic integration, so 
the preferences of individual class members were irrelevant as a substantive 
matter. But this shift does not explain why a self-appointed private plaintiff 
could assume for herself the power to enforce the substantive law. 
The progressive federal judges who reassigned rights in this way did not 
offer a trans-substantive theory to explain when rights belonged to groups 
and not individuals. Put differently, they provided no substance-neutral 
metric to determine when litigant preferences, which otherwise thwarted 
class treatment and class-wide res judicata, would prove irrelevant to the 
question of whether a proposed class met the requisite interest 
representation threshold. 
Most likely these judges remolded class action doctrine in these cases 
because they believed that integration needed the class treatment of claims. 
No direct evidence confirms that this was so. But the timing of Rule 23‘s 
vicissitudes in desegregation suits, the tight link between developments in 
substantive law and class action doctrine, and the fact that until 1965 
lawsuits were the only tools to pursue desegregation suggest the important 
role judges‘ substantive commitments played in this procedural change.197   
Class action doctrine before Brown took its modest steps forward at a 
time of improving race relations,
198
 in cases not particularly likely to 
galvanize a strong backlash.
199
 Moreover, at this time, a significant gap 
                                                                                                                       
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 867. 
 196. Id. at 865 n.62. 
 197. Cf. William VanDercreek, The ―Is‖ and ―Ought‖ of Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 
48 IOWA L. REV. 273, 278–79 (1963) (noting that courts are more willing to make findings of 
adequacy when the litigation is socially desirable, citing to a desegregation case). 
 198. See KLARMAN, supra note 148, at 173. See generally id. at 3–4. 
 199. The NAACP brought teacher pay suits in the 1940s expressly to equalize salaries, not for 
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existed between what the law promised and social realities, with relief 
through litigation the only means to address the gap.
200
 Black teachers at the 
start of the NAACP‘s equal pay campaign earned half of what their white 
counterparts took home,
201
 and despite NAACP victories in higher 
education cases starting in 1938,
202
 southern universities and colleges 
remained overwhelmingly segregated into the 1950s.
203
 During this period, 
judges may well have shared the sympathies of the general public—that is, 
they may well have supported gradual desegregation—and their sole 
responsibility to implement the substantive law may have pressured them to 
liberalize class action doctrine slightly.  
FLSA lawsuits of the 1940s, which produced case law emblematic of the 
highly restrictive general course of class action doctrine, offer a helpful 
contrast. They involved the opposite relationship between substantive 
conditions and procedural results. Even at the statute‘s inception in 1938, 
wages at the vast majority of businesses in the United States satisfied or 
surpassed its minimum wage requirement,
204
 and they would double over 
the next seven years.
205
 The U.S. Department of Labor vigorously and 
effectively enforced the statute,
206
 rendering private litigation very much an 
afterthought. Federal judges did not shoulder the same responsibility for law 
enforcement as they did in early race relations cases. 
Desegregation class action doctrine retreated right after Brown, when the 
negative reaction to the decision galvanized an extreme southern 
backlash.
207
 At best, southern federal courts reluctantly accepted the 
decision and in many instances expressly repudiated it or significantly 
                                                                                                                       
desegregation. Risa Lauren Goluboff, ―Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself‖: The NAACP, 
Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1393, 1431 
(2005); see also Beezer, supra note 146, at 204 (referring to this strategy as ―cautious and 
conservative‖). The higher education suits, at least in theory, were also consistent with ―separate but  
equal,‖ since the theory in these cases was not that segregation was per se unequal but that the 
segregated facilities blacks had to endure were not in fact equal to white ones. E.g., Wilson v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 92 F. Supp. 986, 988 (E.D. La. 1950); 
Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ky., 83 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Ky. 1949); see also Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (explaining the theory of these suits); cf. KLARMAN, supra 
note 148, at 210–11 (describing lack of opposition to higher education suits). 
 200. See e.g., Herbert O. Reid, Efforts to Eliminate Legally-Enforced Segregation Through 
Federal, State, and Local Legislation, 20 J. NEGRO EDUC. 436, 436 (1951). 
 201. S. EDUC. REPORTING SERV., SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS 142 (Patrick 
McCauley & Edward D. Ball eds., 1959).  
 202. See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).  
 203. KLARMAN, supra note 148, at 255. 
 204. Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, and 
the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200, Bills to Provide for 
the Establishment of Fair Labor Standards in Employments in and Affecting Interstate Commerce 
and for Other Purposes, Part II, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., June 7–15, 1937, at 338–42 (providing wages 
in most American industries).  
 205. See WILLIS J. NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE: THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 
MINIMUM WAGE PROGRAM 61–71 (1997). 
 206. Id. at 59–60. 
 207. KLARMAN, supra note 148, at 385. 
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clipped its wings.
208
 Many southern judges in the mid-1950s were Roosevelt 
or Truman appointees who rose to prominence through the white 
supremacist Democratic machines that ruled southern states. They often 
accepted transparently bad faith compliance, such as resistance strategies by 
which southern states individualized discrimination, as sufficient to meet 
Brown‘s ―all deliberate speed‖ formulation.209 Challenges to pupil 
placement laws, which exemplified this individualization, provided the 
substantive milieu in which cautious or recalcitrant federal judges again 
invoked the formal nature of rights to deny class treatment. The social 
pressure and, in some instances, physical peril that judges more sympathetic 
to the NAACP faced may have left the judges less inclined to enforce 
Brown‘s mandate with vigor.210 Historically lionized exceptions, like Judge 
J. Skelly Wright in New Orleans, prove the rule.  
Several pertinent facts provided the backdrop for desegregation 
litigation during the third period of procedural development. First, at least 
until the 1964–1965 school year, when the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services began to take action pursuant to Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act,
211
 judicial decree remained the sole mechanism to implement 
desegregation policy. Brown‘s fate hinged solely on litigation, rested in 
important part on judicial shoulders, and may have pressured judges to 
respond accordingly. Second, the shift from pupil placement laws to 
freedom of choice plans, less obviously pretextual mechanisms to maintain 
segregation, required the reconception of Brown‘s mandate as requiring 
integration if litigation would end monochromatic schools. For a suit 
seeking this systemic relief to proceed as a class action, doctrine had to 
evolve.  
Third, a key set of federal judges who controlled the Fifth Circuit, which 
at the time included all of the Deep South except for the Carolinas and 
Virginia, favored desegregation by the early 1960s.
212
 A rough survey of 
case law during this period yields a tight correlation between a judge‘s 
sympathy for integration and his aggressiveness with respect to class action 
doctrine. Judge Frank Johnson—an ―integratin‘, carpetbaggin‘, 
scalawaggin‘, baldfaced liar,‖ to quote his law school classmate (and former 
Alabama Governor) George Wallace
213— described class actions as ―one of 
                                                                                                                       
 208. Id. at 354; Kenneth N. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the 
South, J. POLITICS 337, 346 (1964); John Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating 
Political Role of Federal Courts, 21 SW. L.J. 411, 420 (1967) (observing that, ―District courts are 
understandably loathe to change local customs . . . .‖).  
 209. Gibson v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade Cnty., Fla., 272 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1959); 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 162 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D. Ala. 
1958). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation—Progress and 
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 203 (1964); Steamer, supra note 160, at 429. 
 210. E.g., Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POLI. SCI. 
REV. 1017, 1030 (1959). 
 211. E.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 52–53 (2d ed. 2008). 
 212. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 23–25 (1981). 
 213. Robert D. McFadden, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge Whose Rulings Helped Desegregate 
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the most effective devices used by plaintiffs‖ in desegregation suits214 and 
routinely let them proceed as such.
215
 Fifth Circuit Judges John Minor 
Wisdom, John Brown, Richard Rives, and Elbert Tuttle—the Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse to their segregationist colleague Ben 
Cameron
216—each authored important opinions in desegregation cases 
pushing class action doctrine forward.
217
 In contrast, Cameron, who 
described the South as a ―‗conquered province‘‖ victimized by the ―so-
called Civil Rights Statutes,‖ insisted that desegregation claims could not 
satisfy Rule 23.
218
 Arch-segregationist district judges like J. Robert 
Elliott,
219
 George Timmerman,
220
 Sidney Mize,
221
 and others
222
 likewise 
refused to allow class allegations in race relations cases.  
* * * 
The connection between substance and procedure is often invoked but 
difficult to prove irrefutably. Several concluding observations, however, 
                                                                                                                       
the South, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1999, at A12. 
 214. Johnson, supra note 151, at 1163. 
 215. E.g., Harris v. Bullock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 959, 960 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Carr v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. 
Supp. 724, 727 (M.D. Ala. 1963); Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297, 298 (M.D. 
Ala. 1963). 
 216. Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Birmingham, Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 323 F.2d 333, 
353 n.1 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting); see also Jack Bass, The ‗Fifth Circuit Four‘: How 
Four Federal Judges Brought the Rule of Reason to the South, THE NATION, May 3, 2004, at 30, 30–
32. 
 217. E.g., United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 845 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(Wisdom, J.); Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1965) (Tuttle, J.); Calhoun v. Latimer, 
321 F.2d 302, 312 (5th Cir. 1963) (Rives, J., dissenting); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 
1963) (Brown, J.); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.); 
Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1958) (Tuttle, J.); Avery v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1957) (Rives, J.). 
 218. E.g., Sharp, 252 F.2d at 919 (Cameron, J., dissenting). 
 219. Anderson v. Kelly, 32 F.R.D. 355, 358 (M.D. Ga. 1963); see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Civil 
Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814, 823 (1982) (reviewing Jack Bass‘s Unlikely Heroes 
and referring to Judge Elliott as a ―committed segregationist‖).  
 220. Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm‘n, 175 F. Supp. 343, 345 (W.D.S.C. 1959); see Henry 
v. Greenville Airport Comm‘n, 191 F. Supp. 146, 146 (W.D.S.C. 1961) (Timmerman, J.) (accusing 
the Fourth Circuit of bias when forced to issue injunction in favor of black plaintiff); David W. 
Southern, Beyond Jim Crow Liberalism: Judge Waring‘s Fight Against Segregation in South 
Carolina, 1942–52, 66 J. NEGRO HIST. 209, 220 (1981) (referring to Judge Timmerman as a ―rigid 
segregationist‖).  
 221. Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445, 446 (S.D. Miss. 1964); Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. 
Supp. 539, 540 (S.D. Miss. 1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 206 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D. Miss. 1962); see 
supra note 133 (describing Judge Mize‘s views). 
 222. E.g., Reddix v. Lucky, 148 F. Supp. 108, 109 (W.D. La. 1957) (Dawkins, J.); Sharp, 148 F. 
Supp. at 8 (Dawkins, J.); Watts v. Hous. Auth. of Birmingham Dist., 150 F. Supp. 552, 553 (N.D. 
Ala. 1956) (Lynne, J.); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 719–20 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (Lynne, J., 
dissenting) (refusing to find Plessy v. Ferguson overruled); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & 
DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1915–1972, at 311 (1995) (referring to 
Judge Dawkins as ―distinctly unsympathetic to the civil rights cause‖);Vines, supra note 122, at 317 
(referring to Judge Lynne as ―noted for his segregationist views‖).  
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suggest that class action doctrine in the 1950s and early 1960s owed its ebbs 
and flows to the tides of substantive justice. In no other substantive area did 
courts in equitable relief cases disregard litigant preferences and treat class 
judgments as broadly preclusive. Supposed features of injunctive relief did 
not play a role in this evolution.
223
 Second, while interest representation 
justified class-wide preclusion more generally, courts did not explain the 
empowered res judicata force of civil rights judgments in its terms. Put 
differently, they offered no trans-substantive reason for why conflicts of 
interest did not thwart these nominally spurious suits the way they did 
elsewhere. Interest representation alone could not have provided the 
normative foundation for the mandatory class suit. 
IV.  THE 1966 AUTHORS AND DESEGREGATION  
The 1966 authors appreciated that the decision to let a case proceed as a 
class action equaled the determination that a judgment should generate 
class-wide res judicata.
224
 Because their ―rebuil[t]‖ Rule 23 had to lose its 
formalistic taint,
225
 class certification and the preclusive force of judgments 
could not depend on categories of rights. Interest representation doctrine, 
which by mid-century focused on real-world circumstances and not 
conceptual traits peculiar to particular abstractly conceived rights, made the 
class suit‘s empowerment possible. Moreover, three of the four types of 
class suits the new Rule 23 would ultimately authorize required no departure 
from this precedent that had evolved before 1966. Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1)(B) essentially continued the true class suit, one well-established in 
equity and then after the 1938 Federal Rules as broadly preclusive. At least 
in theory, notice and opt-out rights reconciled Rule 23(b)(3) with the 
requirement of perfect harmony. The possibility of exit could justify the 
conceit that remaining class members shared the representative‘s 
interests.
226
 Mandatory class treatment of claims in Rule 23(b)(2) suits, 
without a notice requirement, is the hardest to explain in terms of the law 
with which the 1966 authors worked.  
In this Part, I mine existing records of the Advisory Committee‘s work 
in the early 1960s to find the answer to the Rule 23 puzzle most in line with 
what its members had in mind. I argue that substantive preferences, not any 
                                                                                                                       
 223. I found a single pre-1966 source to assert that ―cases in which injunctive relief is sought‖ 
represented an exception to the general rule against res judicata in spurious class suits. The comment 
cites an article about class actions in the desegregation context as its sole evidence for this claim. 
Comment, The Spurious Class Suit: Procedural and Practical Problems Confronting Court and 
Counsel, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 627, 628 (1958). 
224. In a May 1962 memorandum to the Advisory Committee in which he summarized existing 
doctrine, Kaplan insisted that ―the advantages of a class action are maximized when as a result of the 
action the class is legally bound.‖ He then asked, ―What, then, are the requisites of such a model class 
action?‖ Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Action—Rule 23, at EE-21 
(May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CIS-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 225. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to ―The Class Action—Symposium,‖ 10 BOSTON C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1968); see also Kaplan, supra note 47, at 380.  
 226. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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trans-substantive re-imagining of the doctrine of interest representation, 
provided Rule 23(b)(2) with its normative foundation, for three chief 
reasons. First, the 1966 authors relied on desegregation class action case 
law, itself a product of substantive preference, to justify the new power they 
wanted Rule 23 to have. Second, none of the answers described in Part I, nor 
any other trans-substantive explanation, appears in these records. Third, 
Rule 23(b)(2)‘s contours evolved solely in response to the circumstances of 
early 1960s desegregation litigation.   
A.  Desegregation and the Basis for Expanded Res Judicata 
Expressing a sentiment shared by most committee members, Professor 
Benjamin Kaplan insisted that ―[f]ull, ‗two-way‘ binding effect‖ of class 
action judgments ―should be the norm.‖227 The source of procedural 
rulemaking power, the Rules Enabling Act, prohibits rules that ―modify any 
substantive right,‖ and, as alluded to, the preclusive force of judgments is 
considered entwined with substantive rights.
228
 The 1966 authors thus 
needed a source exogenous to their own statutory license to justify 
preclusive judgments in what had previously been spurious (and thus non-
preclusive) class suits.  
Kaplan, the committee‘s reporter, and Albert Sacks, who later joined his 
Harvard colleague as associate reporter, insisted that existing doctrine 
supported res judicata regardless of category of class suit.
229
 But they had 
difficulty identifying cases in which this was actually true. Kaplan referred 
to the so-called ―‗one-way‘ intervention‖ cases—cases in which absent class 
members could affirmatively intervene after some favorable determination 
in the case—as ―foreshadow[ing]‖ this expansive res judicata.230 But in 
                                                                                                                       
 227. Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Action—Rule 23, at EE-31 
(May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CIS-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). An early 
version of the revised Rule 23 provided for this explicitly. See Preliminary Draft, Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-2 (Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-
8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (providing that, ―The judgment in an action 
maintained as a class action shall extend by its terms to the members of the class as defined, whether 
or not favorable to them.‖).  
 228. See supra notes 71, 92 and accompanying text. 
 229. Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan and Albert Sacks to the Chairman and Members of 
the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(June 10, 1965), at 6–7, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 696, Folder 2 (―growing point in the 
law‖); Transcript of Session on Class Actions 16 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-
7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (comments by Albert Sacks) (insisting that, ―There 
have been some . . . which have been classified . . . as spurious . . . and yet judges have suggested that 
they be binding, so that . . . you have a developing law in the field.‖). 
 230. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-32 to EE-33 (Feb. 1963), 
microformed on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). An earlier effort to strengthen 
Rule 23 similarly illustrates the paucity of case law to support the invigorated Rule 23 the Advisory 
Committee sought. In 1953, Charles Alan Wright, then a young professor and an assistant to 
Advisory Committee reporter Charles Clark, drafted a rule replacing the 1938 version with an 
approach based on adequacy of representation. See Assistant to the Reporter‘s Suggested 
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these cases absent class members had affirmatively signaled their desire to 
be bound, an opt-in basis for res judicata quite ill-suited for the rule they 
wanted.  
The sole doctrinal support came from desegregation case law. John P. 
Frank, by then one of the country‘s premier and most thoughtful 
practitioners, opposed the expansion of res judicata beyond its existing 
boundaries,
231
 and he insisted that the new doctrine Kaplan and others 
sought would ―work[] a plain revolution‖ for the law of class actions.232  
Kaplan, in response, noted that ―desegregation suits . . . are theoretically 
spurious class actions, but there isn‘t a judge in the world that‘s treating 
them that way . . . .‖233 The ―classic example‖ of a class action generating a 
broadly preclusive judgment regardless of category of right, Kaplan 
continued, is ―of course the desegregation cases.‖234 
B.  Possible Trans-Substantive Answers 
Under the 1938 rule, spurious class suits included money damages and 
injunctive relief cases and, regardless of remedy, pursued judgments did not 
preclude absent class members from further litigation. No doctrinal basis 
other than that found in desegregation case law supported the expansion of 
res judicata outside of true suits. No distinction based on type of remedy 
appears in the law of interest representation before 1966. The material the 
1966 authors worked with, in other words, did not distinguish between 
money damages and injunctive relief suits. Why, then, did they provide for 
notice and opt-out rights in the former and not the latter? None of the 
proposed solutions discussed in Part I that explain the link between 
procedural right and remedial choice in trans-substantive terms appear in the 
historical record.  
                                                                                                                       
Amendments (May 13, 1953), at 7–8, in Wright Papers, supra note 3, Box 239, Folder 5. Clark then 
proposed something similar to Wright‘s suggestion. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra note 71, at 106–07. He hoped that courts would take the hint and conclude that 
class judgments rigorously protected with various checks to ensure adequate representation would 
prove broadly preclusive. Id. at 128. Clark, however, could only invoke Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 
F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952), one of his own opinions, to support this development. Id. at 109. But 
Dickinson was not a spurious class action, and in it, Clark could only muster citations to ―leading text 
writers‖ to urge an approach to preclusion independent of Rule 23‘s rights-based formalism. 
Dickinson, 197 F.2d at 979 & n.4; see also All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247, 249 (2d 
Cir. 1954) (Clark, J.) (discussing Dickinson); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 
561, 602–03 (10th Cir. 1961) (discussing Dickinson and noting that, ―It might well be possible to 
devise a procedure which would bind non-intervening members of the ‗class,‘ but the rule does not in 
its present form purport to accomplish this.‖). 
 231. E.g., Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 8, 
microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (insisting that he ―would 
consciously reject‖ a ―res judicata effect on non-participants‖ as an ―objective[] of a revised Rule 
23‖). 
 232. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 18 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 27. 
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1.  Intrinsic Harmony 
To Kaplan, the adequate representation of class member interests meant 
that the requisite ―solidarity‖ existed among class members to license a 
broadly preclusive judgment.
235
 As he understood it, notice served as a 
―procedural safeguard[]‖ to ensure this basis for class-wide preclusion;236 
with notice to absent class members, Kaplan saw ―no reason why the 
question of the adequacy of the representation may not be brought into the 
open.‖237 (Opt-out rights, once they made it in the draft, enjoyed a different 
but related justification.) ―[G]iving notice . . . may enable the court to render 
a judgment with full binding effect when otherwise it could not effectively 
do so,‖ he argued, but ―the grand criterion‖ for a binding ―class action‖ 
―remains the homogenous character of the class.‖238  
This functional account for notice would seem to indicate that Kaplan 
believed that cases where it was unnecessary must have involved classes 
enjoying intrinsic harmony.
239
 He did distinguish fairly early on between 
what would become Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) in terms of the need for 
notice.
240
 Moreover, when the proposal for opt-out rights eventually 
surfaced, and when asked whether he could ―imagine including in [a Rule 
23(b)(2)] class somebody who specifically objects,‖ Kaplan answered 
(without explaining) that he did not ―think the cases typically arising under 
[the provision] would present that problem at all.‖241  
                                                                                                                       
 235. Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Action—Rule 23, at EE-21 to 
EE-25 (May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CIS-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(reasoning that res judicata for the class is appropriate when class members enjoyed ―solidarity‖ or 
―homogeneity‖); id. at EE-11 n.5 (insisting that ―the grand criterion for a class action,‖ by which 
Kaplan meant a binding class action, ―remains the homogenous character of the class‖); id. at EE-21 
to EE-22 (explaining that solidarity exists when members have a ―community of interest‖ or ―some 
anterior bond of association‖); id. at EE-9 (arguing that adequate representation would mean that 
class members ―were in fact members of a unitary class‖). 
 236. Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Action—Rule 23, at EE-4 
(May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CIS-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (―The 
question of the proper extent of the judgment . . . may be closely linked to the question of the 
procedural safeguards afforded to the class through notice . . . .‖). 
 237. Id. at EE-13. 
 238. Id. at EE-11 & n.5.  
 239. Preliminary Draft, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-18 to 
EE-19 (Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(explaining that notice is unnecessary when ―there is cohesiveness or unity in the class‖). 
 240. In proposed notes to accompany an early draft of the revised Rule 23, Kaplan suggested 
that the res judicata force of ―experimental‖ class judgments obtained under what would become Rule 
23(b)(3) should depend in significant measure on ―the question of the procedural safeguards afforded 
to the class through notice . . . .‖ Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-3 to 
EE-4 (Feb. 1963), microformed on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). That his 
notes did not recommend notice to injunctive relief class members suggests that he might have 
thought they necessarily had cohesive interests. 
 241. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 60 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
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 But neither in the extensive memoranda he drafted to lay the legal basis 
for the new rule nor in any other surviving documentation of his efforts did 
Kaplan explain why this intrinsic harmony existed in injunctive relief cases. 
Other hints indicate that he may not have believed that such solidarity was 
actually de rigueur. Frank particularly opposed the idea of binding 
judgments under Rule 23(b)(3) for fear that they would encourage 
defendants to enter into collusive litigation with pliant plaintiffs‘ lawyers.242 
Collusion is the textbook consequence of inadequate representation.
243
 In 
defense of Rule 23(b)(3), Kaplan argued (and Frank agreed) that the danger 
of collusion was no greater than in suits prosecuted under Rule 23(b)(2), a 
provision Frank had grudgingly accepted.
244
 This contention makes little 
sense if Kaplan thought that injunctive relief classes enjoyed intrinsic 
harmony. 
Also, in his early drafts of Rule 23, Kaplan made notice discretionary 
and available as a ―procedural safeguard‖ in any class action, regardless of 
type.
245
 Whether courts should order it would depend on ―the degree that 
there is cohesiveness and unity in the class [and whether] the representation 
is effective.‖246 Kaplan believed that ―notice has an important role to play in 
certain‖ of what would become Rule 23(b)(3) cases.247 But early drafts also 
indicated the wisdom of notice in ―‗limited fund‘‖ cases and as a mechanism 
―to poll members on a proposed modification of a consent decree,‖248 
instances that would fall within the terms of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) 
presently. These early discussions of notice do not evince any indication that 
the Advisory Committee believed as a categorical matter that Rule 23(b)(2) 
                                                                                                                       
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 242. E.g., Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 2 (Mar. 
22, 1963), microformed on CIS-6315 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (―The possibility of 
put-up jobs in strike suits is tremendous.‖). 
 243. Cf. TIDMARSH, supra note 48, at 1137. 
 244. Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan and Albert Sacks to the Chairman and Members of 
the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(June 10, 1965), at 8, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 696, Folder 2 (―growing point in the 
law‖); see also Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 16, 
1964), microformed on CIS-7003-21 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (insisting that ―[t]he 
fraud potential‖ is just as great in other class suits as in Rule 23(b)(3) suits). 
 245. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-5, EE-31, EE-33 (Feb. 1963), 
microformed on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); Preliminary Draft, Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-3 (Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-
8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); Transcript of Session on Class Actions 3 (Oct. 31, 
1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 246. Preliminary Draft, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-18 
(Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 247. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-5 (Feb. 1963), microformed 
on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); Preliminary Draft, Proposed Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-19 (Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-8004-89 (Jud. 
Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 248. Preliminary Draft, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-18 
(Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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classes would enjoy the sort of intrinsic qualities that would invariably 
obviate the need for procedural safeguards. 
2.  Pragmatism 
Equally missing—perhaps more so—are either of the pragmatic 
solutions discussed in Part I for the absence of procedural safeguards in 
Rule 23(b)(2) suits. The remedial indivisibility justification explains 
mandatory class treatment on grounds that opt-out rights would be pointless 
because courts cannot tailor injunctions only to benefit specific plaintiffs. 
The drafting history of Rule 23(b)(2) poorly fits this account. Twice 
committee members considered and did not accept proposals explicitly 
motivated by remedial indivisibility. Quite early on, Frank suggested a 
revision of Rule 23 that would allow mandatory class treatment of claims 
―[i]f the practical effect of the relief granted . . . is to make it impossible or 
impractical to litigate the matter further.‖ In these cases, ―the result should 
be binding‖ on the class because these cases would involve ―a unitary course 
of action in which there is no divisibility.‖249 Kaplan‘s subsequent draft 
included no such language.
250
  
Frank then proposed a version of Rule 23(b)(2) that would have allowed 
class treatment when ―[t]he disposition of the subject matter . . . would 
make it impracticable to provide a different result in subsequent litigation of 
the same subject matter.‖251 Kaplan apparently wanted a more expansive 
rule, for his next stab at Rule 23(b)(2) would have allowed class treatment 
when separate actions ―would create a risk of unfair or impractical 
differentiation of treatment among the members of the class.‖252 By 
―unfair,‖ Kaplan had in mind situations in which, because of readily 
divisible relief, a court could unjustly differentiate among similarly situated 
persons. He invoked desegregation litigation to explain his proposal to 
Frank: 
If a school desegregation case, for example, is maintained 
by an individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class 
action, very likely the relief will be confined to admission of 
the individual to the school and will not encompass broad 
corrective measures—desegregation of the school. This would 
be unfortunate. . . . I may add that if the action is not 
                                                                                                                       
 249. Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 9, 
microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). Frank insisted that ―race 
relations‖ cases, which no one disputes Rule 23(b)(2) was chiefly designed for, should not satisfy this 
indivisibility metric. Id.; see also Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 
629, 648–49 (1965).  
 250. Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, at EE-5 to 
EE-6 (May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CI-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 251. Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Ben Kaplan, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 
3, Box 111, Folder 2. 
 252. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-11 (Feb. 1963), microformed 
on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis added). 
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maintained as a class action, the contempt remedy would 
presumably not be available to anyone but the individual 
plaintiff, and others in similar position could be put to separate 
proceedings with ensuing delay.
253
 
The notes Kaplan drafted for this Rule 23(b)(2) prototype explained its 
reach solely in terms of ―unfairly differentiated treatment.‖254 This stress is 
understandable, as a wholly separate provision (the prototype for Rule 
23(b)(1)(A)) covered ―situations where the judgment in a nonclass 
action . . ., while not technically concluding the other members, might do so 
as a practical matter.‖255 To explain this prototype of Rule 23(b)(2) as 
motivated by indivisibility makes it redundant. 
 The historical backdrop against which the 1966 authors wrote Rule 
23(b)(2) also militates against the second pragmatic answer described in 
Part I, the idea that mandatory class treatment of injunctive relief claims 
would spare a defendant from the burdensome relitigation of identical 
claims. As the strategy behind the pupil placement laws confirmed, southern 
states wanted nothing more than to litigate desegregation claims repeatedly 
in individual actions. Class treatment of these claims, which the 1966 
authors obviously desired,
256
 would deny defendants this delaying tactic, not 
relieve them of an unwanted burden. 
3.  Autonomy 
Part I also discusses autonomy-based answers to the Rule 23 puzzle. 
Briefly, they explain that classes, not individual class members, have rights 
to sue in injunctive relief cases. Individual class members thus have lesser 
autonomy interests at stake and therefore do not need notice or opt-out 
rights. Some of the 1966 authors, particularly Frank, cared deeply about 
class member autonomy and argued vigorously for robust opt-out rights on 
this ground.
257
 But no one offered any theory to explain why injunctive 
                                                                                                                       
 253. Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), microformed on CIS-6312-
31(Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 254. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-25 (Feb. 1963), microformed 
on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).  
 255. Id. at EE-22. 
 256. See infra notes 257–58 and accompanying text. 
 257. Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 9, 
microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); Letter from John P. Frank to 
Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 21, 1963), microformed on CI-6312-20 (Jud. 
Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (fearing ―the loss of individual liberty‖). Few of the others most 
responsible for Rule 23‘s present form cared as much about individual autonomy. None initially 
envisioned opt-out rights as part of class action practice. In the early 1950s, Wright and Clark 
suggested a revision of Rule 23 that would have let judges in their discretion order notice to ensure 
adequacy, but nothing suggests that either contemplated some mechanism to preserve a modicum of 
individual control over claims. See Assistant to the Reporter‘s Suggested Amendments (May 13, 
1953), at 7–8 , in Wright Papers, supra note 3, Box 239, Folder 5; see also Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 71, at 105–39 (discussing Rule 23, making no mention of opt-
out rights). Kaplan‘s early drafts similarly included notice provisions but nothing remotely like opt-
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relief class members had less of a personal stake in their claims than did 
their money damages counterparts. Indeed, Frank in the end ―subordinate[d] 
[his] own doubts‖ as to Rule 23(b)(2) for political reasons, not because he 
had come up with some autonomy rationale for mandatory class 
treatment.
258
  
C.  Desegregation and the Origins of Rule 23(b)(2)  
Even as they justified notice and opt-out rights in due process terms, 
none of the 1966 authors, at least as documented in the records of the 
Advisory Committee, explained those safeguards‘ absence from Rule 
23(b)(2) suits in terms of some autonomy or interest representation theory. 
The only recorded considerations to have shaped the provision involved 
concerns about desegregation litigation. This substance-specific motivation 
for Rule 23(b)(2)‘s contours can explain the Rule 23 puzzle. 
1.  The Drafting of Rule 23(b)(2)  
The men who championed Rule 23(b)(2) worked actively for civil 
rights.
259
 Kaplan, a veteran of human rights causes,
260
 assisted the NAACP 
with Shelley v. Kraemer in the late 1940s.
261
 He also served as Thurgood 
Marshall‘s chief source of law clerks during Marshall‘s stint on the Second 
Circuit.
262
 Sacks worked with the NAACP, and he marched on Washington 
                                                                                                                       
out rights. After the committee decided to include opt-out rights for Rule 23(b)(3) actions, Kaplan 
and Sacks argued that these rights‘ enjoyment should depend on the case-specific determination as to 
whether absent class members‘ ―inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.‖ Memorandum on Completion of Work of Committee Meeting of Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, 
at 7 (Dec. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-25 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). Even 
Charles Wyzanski, the prominent federal judge and committee member who had proposed opt-out 
rights in the first place, agreed to make opt-out rights contingent. Letter from Charles E. Wyzanski, 
Jr., Judge, to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec. 4, 1963), microformed on CIS-
7003-02 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). His opposition to an even weaker opt-out provision 
Kaplan and Sacks suggested was based on a ―political consideration‖ as to which proposal would 
likely win the bar‘s support, not concerns for individual autonomy. Id. 
 258. Letter from John P. Frank from Benjamin Kaplan, Harvard Law Sch. 8 (May 4, 1965), 
microformed on CI-6403-86 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 259. Not just its champions. Frank, who only grudgingly accepted Rule 23(b)(2), also was a 
stalwart and powerful supporter of the civil rights cause. As a young professor at the University of 
Indiana in the late 1940s, he brought several civil rights suits  in an effort to desegregate various 
places in Bloomington. See John P. Frank, A Sort of Professional Autobiography 8 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author). He also put together an amicus brief signed by many law 
professors on behalf of the plaintiffs in Sweatt v. Painter. Id. at 9; see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950) (overturning as unconstitutional the University of Texas Law School‘s denial of 
admission to a black student based on his race).  
 260. Kaplan had served as a Nuremberg prosecutor after World War II. See Allan Ryan, 
Judgments on Nuremberg: The Past Half Century and Beyond—A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg 
Prosecutors, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 193–94, 199–202 (1995).  
 261. Constance Baker Motley, Standing on His Shoulders: Thurgood Marshall‘s Early Career, 
6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 9, 14 (1989); see also MOTLEY, supra note 181, at 68. 
 262. E-mail message from Owen Fiss, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to author (Sept. 9, 2010, 10:53 
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with Martin Luther King, Jr., in August 1963, two months before a key 
Advisory Committee meeting at which the modern Rule 23 took shape.
263
 
Wright, the sole southerner among the 1966 authors, had worked to defeat 
Texas‘s legislative response to Brown, which included a pupil placement 
law.
264
 He also led a campaign to desegregate the Episcopal Church in 
Texas and his children‘s private school in Austin.265 An eloquent and 
embittered address Wright gave at the University of Texas‘s memorial 
service for Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968 bespeaks a deep emotional 
commitment to the cause.
266
 Rule 23(b)(2)‘s most ardent supporter, Wright 
knew intimately the progress and frustrations of desegregation litigation by 
the time the efforts to revise Rule 23 got underway.
267
  
Although they gave Rule 23(b)(2) a public veneer of trans-
substantivity,
268
 the 1966 authors described it solely in terms of 
desegregation.
269
 Virtually every effort to shape its terms, even before 
Kaplan‘s first draft of the revised Rule 23, reflected the circumstances of 
this litigation. Quite early on, Frank suggested a new Rule 23 that would not 
have covered ―race relations‖ cases.270 Wright responded with a description 
                                                                                                                       
AM) (on file with the author). 
 263. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to 
The Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS li, cvii & n.252 (revised ed. 1994); Jack Greenberg, Civil 
Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997). 
264. Charles Alan Wright, Race Bills—A Constitutional Analysis, The Texas Observer, Apr. 23, 
1957, at 1, 4. Wright also supported federal civil rights legislation in 1960, and that year, he 
considered but ultimately turned down an offer to serve in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. See Letter to Jacob Javits from Charles Alan Wright, Feb. 3, 1960, in WRIGHT 
PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 125, Folder 2. 
 265. See e.g., Remarks of Charles Alan Wright at St. Andrew‘s Episcopal School Board 
Meeting, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 651, Folder 2. 
 266. Wright accused ―[a]ll who opposed Dr. King‖ as ―complicit[] for the tragedy in Memphis,‖ 
and identified by name the dean of the Notre Dame Law School as particularly blameworthy. 
Remarks of Professor Charles Alan Wright, University of Texas Law School, at the Memorial Service 
at the University for Dr. Martin Luther King, Apr. 5, 1968, at 3, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 3, 
Box 75, Folder 5.  
 267. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 16, 
1963), microformed on CIS-7004-34 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (describing himself as 
―keenly interested‖ in ―desegregation actions as class suits‖). 
 268. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee‘s note (―Subdivision (b)(2) is not limited to 
civil-rights cases.‖). 
 269. Kaplan tried to quiet anxiety about Rule 23(b)(2)‘s expansive terms by agreeing with James 
William Moore, who described it as ―designed mainly for civil rights cases.‖ Transcript of Session on 
Class Actions 64 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, 
Cong. Info. Serv.). Moore was concerned about Rule 23(b)(2) permitting class suits for declaratory 
relief that might come accompanied with incidental damages. He indicated his willingness to go 
along with Rule 23(b)(2) if limited to civil rights litigation. Id. Wright agreed that Rule 23(b)(2) was 
―the integration section.‖ Id. at 58. Frank called Rule 23(b)(2) cases, ―the segregation cases.‖ Id. at 
36. George Doub, a committee member, believed ―that [Rule 23(b)](2) is essential in the civil rights 
field.‖ Id. at 15. Rossel Thomsen, another committee member, stated that Rule 23(b)(2) should 
―cover the segregation cases.‖ Id. at 37. 
 270. Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, at 10–11, 
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of a lawsuit brought by three University of Texas students to desegregate 
dormitories. It would be ―quite intolerable,‖ he argued, if their victory would 
nonetheless require the next year‘s students to bring the same suit.271 Frank 
continued to worry that the prototype for Rule 23(b)(2), designed 
―particularly [for] the civil rights cases,‖ would ―include the universe 
and . . . exclude nothing.‖  But he admitted that his ―good friends Charlie 
Wright and [Judge J.] Skelly Wright,‖ two stalwart proponents of 
desegregation litigation, ―tell me [that] I am wrong, and this may well be a 
case in which two ‗[W]rights‘ do make me wrong.‖272  He thus proposed a 
version of Rule 23(b)(2) that would cover class actions brought ―to conduct 
an unsegregated school.‖273 ―As you see,‖ Frank wrote Wright, ―you are 
making a believer out of me on civil rights.‖274 Wright voiced his 
appreciation ―that you have come to be a believer about the class action in 
segregation suits.‖275  
Kaplan‘s first draft of Rule 23 did not distinguish between injunctive 
relief and money damages class suits.
276
 His second one included the first 
prototype of Rule 23(b)(2), which would have made class actions 
―presumptively maintainable‖ when ―adjudication in separate 
action[s] . . . would create a risk of unfair or impractical differentiation of 
treatment among the members of the class.‖277 Kaplan cited a single 
consumer protection case and five civil rights opinions as illustrations for 
how this nonspecific language would apply.
278
  
The only apparent issues the Advisory Committee considered between 
this draft and the next, which phrased Rule 23(b)(2) essentially as it 
currently reads, related to desegregation cases. Wright was very ―disturbed‖ 
that the provision made class treatment ―only presumptively proper.‖279 He 
described a recent case where a well-known segregationist judge had denied 
class treatment, then limited the injunction desegregating the defendant‘s 
bus lines to the three named plaintiffs. Given how this judge manipulated 
                                                                                                                       
microformed on CIS-6310-17 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 271. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 7, 
1962), microformed on CIS-6310-49 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 272. Memorandum, from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 3 
(Jan. 21, 1963), microformed on CI-6312-20 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).   
 273. Undated Memorandum from John P. Frank to Ben Kaplan, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 
3, Box 111, Folder 2. 
 274. Memorandum from John P. Frank to Charles Alan Wright, (Feb. 9), in WRIGHT PAPERS, 
supra note 3, Box 111, Folder 2. 
 275. Letter from Charles A. Wright to John P. Frank (Feb. 12, 1963), in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra 
note 3, Box 111, Folder 2. 
 276. See Memorandum from Reporter Professor Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, at EE-5 
to EE-6 (May 28–30, 1962), microformed on CI-6309-44 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 277. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-10 to EE-11 (Feb. 1963), 
microformed on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 278. Id. at EE-25. 
 279. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 6, 
1963), microformed on CIS-6312-65 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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procedure to achieve an unjust end, Wright argued, ―[i]t is absolutely 
essential to the progress of integration that such suits be treated as class 
actions, with the judgment binding on all members of the class.‖280 Several 
days later, John Brown, one of the Fifth Circuit‘s progressive judges, mailed 
Wright a slip copy of Potts v. Flax, a key 1963 opinion that, among other 
things, treated the rights at stake in a desegregation suit as group rights. 
Thanking Brown, Wright told him that ―one of the principal issues‖ for the 
Advisory Committee ―will be whether desegregation suits are properly class 
actions.‖281 He immediately wrote a letter to Kaplan, quoting at length from 
the decision.
282
 When Kaplan redrafted the provision, he included language 
that provided simply that class suits could be ―maintained,‖ expressly in 
response to Wright‘s advocacy.283   
Frank also responded to Kaplan‘s second draft, suggesting that the 
language change was meant to or should cover desegregation litigation but 
not much else.
284
 Kaplan agreed to try for narrower language to ensure ―that 
unintended categories do not come in‖ but repeated his earlier insistence 
that the provision cover ―civil rights cases.‖285 Perhaps one may 
appropriately read the next draft, which used terms quite similar to the 
current Rule‘s, as intending a narrower application in line with their 
discussion. This prototype of Rule 23(b)(2) would have required class 
certification when ―the questions of law and fact are substantially identical 
with respect to all members . . . and . . . [specific] relief may appropriately 
be given in the form of a judgment having general application to the class as 
a whole.‖286 Further reflecting his exchange with Frank, Kaplan‘s next draft 
of the committee notes cited only to civil rights cases as Rule 23(b)(2) 
exemplars.
287
  
Rule 23(b)(2)‘s supporters had to resist a final effort to eliminate the 
provision before its ultimate inclusion was assured. Frank worried that Rule 
23(b)(2) would open a backdoor through which a would-be mass tort 
defendant could bring a declaratory judgment action and obtain a clean bill 
                                                                                                                       
 280. Id. (referencing Bailey v. Patterson, 206 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Miss. 1962)). 
 281. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to John Brown, Feb. 18, 1963, in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra 
note 3, Box 478, Folder 1. 
 282. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Feb. 16, 
1963), microformed on CIS-7004-34 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 283. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions EE-2 (Feb. 1963), microformed 
on CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (noting that the subdivision was revised in 
light of Professor Wright‘s texts).   
 284. Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Jan. 21, 1963), microformed on CIS-6312-
31(Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Memorandum, Modification of Rule 23 on Class Actions 2 (Feb. 1963), microformed on 
CIS-6313-56 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).  
 287. Preliminary Draft, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure EE-12 
(Mar. 15, 1963), microformed on CIS-8004-89 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). The draft 
notes do insist that ―(b)(2)is not limited to civil-rights cases‖ but does not cite any illustrative case to 
this effect. Id. 
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of health that bound all of its victims.
288
 No benefit that Rule 23(b)(2) might 
create, he argued, outweighed this possible harm. Rule 23(b)(1)(A), which 
licensed class treatment when the prosecution of separate actions could 
create the risk of inconsistent obligations for the defendant, could cover 
desegregation litigation. What were ―more inconsistent results,‖ Frank 
wondered, ―than a possible holding that a school should be segregated as to 
one applicant and not as to another[?]‖289     
Acutely aware of some of the machinations described in Part III that 
southern state legislatures and segregationist judges deployed, Wright and 
Kaplan defended Rule 23(b)(2) mostly on grounds that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) did 
not reach desegregation suits.
290
 A Rule 23 without (b)(2), Kaplan feared, 
would ―leave open the distinct possibility that a Negro child may apply on 
his own behalf for admission to school and would be entitled to a decree in 
his favor alone. . . . There are plenty of Boards who would be very happy to 
be engaged in what you call ‗incompatible standards.‘‖291 What Frank could 
hardly imagine
292—―to tell a school board that it must accept Smith in a 
white school but need not accept Jones‖293—was actually a key southern 
strategy to delay full-scale integration, as Wright explained: 
It is simply torturing language to say that [the ―segregation 
cases‖] involve ―incompatible standards of conduct‖ and come 
under [Rule 23(b)](1)(A)]. The proof of that I think is in the 
action of several Boards: the Fort Worth School Board . . ., 
which said Yes, we‘ll take ____, but we don‘t want the order to 
require us to take other Negroes. They found nothing 
incompatible. The Clemson Board of Trustees, after they had 
already admitted [Harvey] Gantt, petitioned for certiorari 
unsuccessfully to have the class action aspects stricken from 
the decree. Or you can look to the decree which the district 
judge actually entered in Bailey v. Paterson in Miss. after they 
had once won the case in the Supreme Court, and the decree 
was entered providing that the bus company must transport the 
three named plaintiffs without discrimination, but it could . . . 
refuse all other Negroes. These people opposing the class don‘t 
                                                                                                                       
 288. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 8–10 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed 
on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).  
 289. Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 22, 
1963), microformed on CIS-6315-49 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 290. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 9 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.).  
291. Id. at 10.  
 292. Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 22, 
1963), microformed on CIS-6315-49 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 293. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 30, 
1963), microformed on CIS-6315-55 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (noting that, ―This is 
exactly what the Fort Worth School Board wanted to be told . . . .‖). 
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find it incompatible. I don‘t think it is incompatible.294 
―We must take care of these cases‖ in Rule 23(b)(2), Wright insisted, to 
make sure racist judges did not seek cover in imprecise rule terminology.
295
 
Kaplan agreed: ―(2) must remain in to make it absolutely clear that the 
desegregation cases . . . are covered.‖296 
 Frank yielded to this ―belief that [Rule 23(b)(2) is] needed to be sure 
that we cover the segregation case . . . because certainly we want the 
segregation cases covered somewhere.‖297 But he tried to get the committee 
to tighten its text, expressly to exclude the feared declaratory judgment.
298
 
Another committee member seconded the proposal to ―[m]ake it clear that 
this only applies to the type of situation that it‘s directed to, namely, a 
segregation policy or an exclusion policy based on discrimination.‖299 One 
suggestion to this end would have required a defendant in a Rule 23(b)(2) 
suit to have acted ―willfully.‖ With the dispositions of some southern judges 
in mind, Sacks demurred: 
The word ―willfully‖ I think, would be a very regrettable 
inclusion because that word has 15 different meanings from 15 
different courts, and I can think of any number of segregation 
cases in Southern courts today in which that word ―willfully‖ 
would become the basis for tossing this right out, with glee.
300
 
After this proposal‘s defeat, the record reflects no further discussion of Rule 
23(b)(2)‘s terms, which remained basically the same throughout the rest of 
the drafting process.
301
 
When the Advisory Committee decided to include opt-out rights for 
money damages class members as Rule 23 took its final shape, it gave no 
consideration to whether Rule 23(b)(2) suits merited the same or an 
analogous mechanism. Others have told the opt-out rights story, so its 
                                                                                                                       
294. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 13 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); see also Letter from Charles A. Wright to John 
P. Frank (May 24, 1962), in WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 3, Box 111, Folder 3 (―I do not think that 
your note [proposing that segregation cases fit in some other section of Rule 23] answers the 
problems of the race relations cases. If the cases are not properly class actions, the decree merely 
orders the defendant school to admit certain named plaintiffs without regard to race . . . and provides 
no basis for a contempt action if later Negroes are denied their rights.‖). 
 295. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 13 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); see also id. (―On [Rule 23(b)](2) I feel so 
strongly that [Frank] is wrong that once you agree, as he does, that segregation cases must be 
prosecuted as class actions, (as certainly they must) [sic], you have to have (2) to take care of them.‖).  
 296. Id. at 11. 
 297. Id. at 36. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 60 (statement of George Doub). 
 300. Id. at 61. 
 301. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 
Courts with Advisory Committee‘s Notes EE-3 (Feb. 25, 1964), microformed on CI-7003-32 (Jud. 
Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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details do not need repetition here.
302
 Briefly, opt-out rights addressed two 
concerns with Rule 23(b)(3). The idea that a person could be included in a 
class without her approval disquieted Frank on autonomy grounds.
303
 Rule 
23(b)(3)‘s defenders invoked notice and the right to opt out to dismiss this 
worry as unfounded.
304
 Judging by the stubbornness with which Frank and 
others voiced this objection, the more important problem with Rule 23(b)(3) 
was the concern that it would enable collusive class suits in ―mass accident‖ 
cases.
305
 Class counsel and the defense counsel could ―rig‖ a class action, 
settle it cheaply, and thereby preclude class members from litigating 
potentially valuable claims.
306
 Judge Wyzanski proposed the right to opt-out 
to deal with this possibility in a ―mass accident‖ case,307 and, at least for a 
while, it put Frank‘s concern to rest.308 The 1966 authors then required 
notice—instead of recommending it strongly, as in earlier drafts of the rule 
and notes—in order to implement the opt-out right, and, even apart from 
this right, to ensure the requisite cohesiveness necessary for a 
constitutionally sound judgment.
309
 They did not seriously consider the 
prospect of collusion in injunctive relief suits during their discussion of opt-
out rights, and they never indicated why Rule 23(b)(2) classes did not also 
need notice to rest preclusive judgments on a solid due process foundation. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 302. Rabiej, supra note 15, at 333–45. 
 303. Memorandum from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 3 
(Jan. 21, 1963), microformed on CI-6312-20 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.); Dissenting 
Memorandum from John P. Frank to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 2 (May 28, 1965), 
microformed on CI-7107-01 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 304. Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 9 (June 10, 1965). 
 305. E.g., Rabiej, supra note 15, at 341–44; Transcript of Session on Class Actions 9–10 (Oct. 
31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(statement by Frank) (―I could not be persuaded, I think, ever to allow a mass accident to be treated 
as a straight class action, because the values are so tremendous, and the premium it puts on just plain 
bribery on counsel to go a little soft and take it a little easy is just too frightening to contemplate.‖); 
Dissenting Memorandum from John P. Frank to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 2 (May 28, 
1965), microformed on CI-7107-01 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (mentioning mass torts 
and insisting that ―the corruption potential . . . intimidates me‖). For other opinions, see, for example, 
Transcript of Session on Class Actions 51 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on CIS-7104-
53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.) (statement by Professor Moore) (―I can‘t think of anything 
nicer for the general counsel of . . . [a company recently sued in a mass accident case] than your class 
action rule.‖). 
 306. Dissenting Memorandum from John P. Frank to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 2 
(May 28, 1965), microformed on CI-7107-01 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 307. Transcript of Session on Class Actions 51 (Oct. 31, 1963–Nov. 2, 1963), microformed on 
CIS-7104-53 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 308. Id. at 54. 
 309. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts 
with Advisory Committee‘s Notes EE-19 to EE-20 (Feb. 25, 1964), microformed on CI-7003-32 (Jud. 
Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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2.  Substance and Procedure and the Rule 23 Puzzle 
 In one sense, this history of Rule 23(b)(2)‘s apparently exclusive 
concern for desegregation suits leads to a dead end. The 1966 authors were 
sophisticated lawyers, experienced judges, and able theorists. Yet they gave 
no explanation in terms of interest representation for why an injunctive 
relief class judgment could bind absent class members with possibly 
divergent preferences, while a money damages class suit required notice and 
opt-out rights to generate class-wide res judicata. Given their sophistication, 
one quite unlikely explanation is that, with opt-out rights and mandatory 
notice arriving at the eleventh hour to qualm Frank‘s fears, the 1966 authors 
did not reflect on the justification for their inclusion and thus consider at 
least mandatory notice and perhaps some mechanism analogous to opt-out 
rights for other types of class suits. The deep sympathy Rule 23(b)(2)‘s 
champions had for the civil rights cause and the formative influence the 
vagaries of civil rights litigation had on its terms suggest more plausible 
answers to the Rule 23 puzzle.  
First, maybe the 1966 authors mistook the substantive irrelevance of 
class member preferences for procedural irrelevance. As they labored in 
1962 and 1963, the systemic integration understanding of Brown was 
evolving in the Fifth Circuit. By this take on Equal Protection, once a court 
found the existence of unlawful segregation, the remedy—an integration 
injunction—required the reshuffling of school populations. Whether a 
particular black student wanted to attend an integrated school mattered not 
at all. Perhaps the 1966 authors, at least some of whom unquestionably 
knew of this development, believed that the substantive irrelevance of class 
member preferences made them procedurally irrelevant—or irrelevant to 
whether and under what conditions a named plaintiff could prosecute a class 
action in absent class members‘ names—as well.  This belief would have 
been erroneous, for what the substantive law requires does not determine 
procedurally who may enforce it on behalf of whom. 
A second possibility goes to a cultural disconnect. The men who revised 
Rule 23 were well-meaning white elites who may have underappreciated 
some of the complexities of desegregation in their zeal for the cause. Wright 
illustrates. A review of his voluminous papers from the era yields a portrait 
of a man earnestly committed to civil rights but lacking any meaningful 
relationship with a southern black community. There were certain ―obvious 
truths,‖ Wright put it in a letter to the Advisory Committee, such as 
―motherhood is good, [and] segregation is bad.‖310 Perhaps he and his 
colleagues did not realize that some black children might not have wanted to 
attend integrated schools, even though they could have read about this 
prospect in the New York Times Magazine.
311
 They therefore might have 
failed to appreciate that the same sort of conflicts of interest that required 
                                                                                                                       
 310. Letter from Charles A. Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 30, 
1963), microformed on CIS-6315-55 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 311. Hodding Carter, Desegregation Does Not Mean Integration, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 
1962, at 21, 71–72. 
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procedural safeguards of adequacy for Rule 23(b)(3) suits might also fester 
in injunctive relief litigation.  
A third explanation gives the 1966 authors more credit. Given the 
interest representation doctrine of the time, notice and opt-out rights would 
have threatened integration litigation as Wright and Kaplan thought it had to 
be prosecuted, so perhaps they buried the problem of conflicting interests to 
ensure its success under Rule 23. As Wright understood, the effective 
vindication of Fourteenth Amendment rights required systemic integration, 
or the treatment of black students as groups regardless of their individual 
preferences.
312
 This result needed class treatment of claims. The Fifth 
Circuit did not sanction an integration injunction in an individual suit until 
1963,
313
 and regardless of this decision, recalcitrant district judges still cited 
a suit‘s nonclass status to justify meaningless, individual-by-individual 
injunctions. But by the early 1960s, the general course of class action 
doctrine required a perfect harmony of legally relevant interests to let a case 
proceed as a class action. If dissent surfaced among members of a proposed 
class, it could not proceed as such, and foot-dragging judges would have 
their procedural excuse to thwart Brown on the merits. 
Notice and opt-out rights amount to both an awareness that class 
member preferences might conflict and a tool to make these conflicts 
known. If the new Rule 23 had required that desegregation class members 
receive notice, and certainly if it had required something akin to opt-out 
rights, it would have invited dissenting class members to make their 
disagreement known. This manifestation of conflicts, if frankly 
acknowledged by judges, would have required one of two equally 
unattractive responses. On one hand, consistency with the general course of 
interest representation doctrine would have meant the concession that 
desegregation suits could not proceed as class actions. This was a nonstarter 
to men like Kaplan, Sacks, and Wright, who feared the machinations of 
segregationists on the southern federal bench. Alternatively, a judge would 
have to ignore certain conflicts of interest, a change in doctrine at odds with 
the repeated insistence that the new Rule 23 merely codified evolving 
practice, and a tactic that lacked any principled limit or test.
314
  
                                                                                                                       
 312. In an analysis of segregation legislation pending in the Texas legislature in 1957, Wright 
commented critically on Briggs as follows:  
It assumes that there is some third choice available other than segregation or 
integration. . . . It is worthy of note that not a single plan for dealing with the 
schools other than by integration has yet received approval of any court. Until a 
plan is found which ends segregation without requiring integration, it seems to me 
safer, as well as more logical, to assume that these are mutually exclusive 
alternatives. 
Charles Alan Wright, Race Bills–A Constitutional Analysis, THE TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 23, 1957, at 1, 
4. 
 313. Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206–07 (5th Cir. 1963); see also Flax v. Potts, 204 F. 
Supp. 458, 465 (N.D. Tex. 1962).  
 314. See infra notes 324–28 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps a more attractive solution would have been to pretend the 
problem did not exist. The progressive Fifth Circuit judges simply redefined 
the rights at stake to render potentially conflicting interests irrelevant. 
Kaplan, Sacks, and Wright may have similarly buried conflicts of interest by 
refusing either to invite this disagreement or to give class members an 
officially sanctioned mechanism like opt-out rights with which to express 
their conflicting preferences. They could better preserve the fiction that all 
black plaintiffs marched in lockstep and thereby ensure that Rule 23 lent this 
litigation as much help as possible.  
If any of these explanations is correct, Rule 23 suffers from a noble flaw.  
Most simply, it was designed for a particular type of litigation at a 
particularly important point in its development, circumstances that in no 
sense are representative for injunctive relief litigation more generally.  If the 
1966 authors‘ zeal for civil rights blinded them to integration‘s realities, 
then the rule they authored erroneously eschews procedural safeguards for 
injunctive relief class members and veers toward unconstitutional territory. 
If they treated Rule 23(b)(2) class members differently to assist integration 
litigation, then no trans-substantive explanation justifies the lesser 
procedural rights these members enjoy. Interest representation, the modern 
class suit‘s constitutional license, cannot provide a complete normative 
foundation for Rule 23 as it presently exists. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY CLASS ACTION DOCTRINE  
The substance-specific answer the history of Rule 23(b)(2)‘s origins 
provides to the Rule 23 puzzle has a number of implications for present-day 
doctrine and theory. Most fundamentally, it calls into question a basic 
premise of the Federal Rules, that they operate as a trans-substantive 
procedural regime. If Rule 23(b)(2)‘s origins are illustrative of purposeful 
motivations lurking behind the text of procedural rules more generally, this 
particular relationship between substance and procedure raises a host of 
questions. Can procedural reformers promulgating rules outside a legislative 
process act legitimately when concerns of substantive justice drive the 
drafting process so exclusively? What happens to the possibility of 
significant procedural reform when rulemakers disagree on where the 
substantively just result lies? To what extent do substantive motivations 
matter to a rule‘s legitimacy when its terms are formally, if not functionally, 
substance-neutral? More specifically, the historical answer to the Rule 
23(b)(2) puzzle sheds light on difficult problems in class action doctrine. It 
helps explain, for example, why courts have failed so remarkably to grapple 
with conflicts of interest in injunctive relief suits.
315
 The answer also yields 
insight for specific but recurrent issues, such as whether back pay claims in 
employment discrimination suits should proceed under Rule 23(b)(2).
316
  
                                                                                                                       
 315. See supra Part I.B. 
 316. Courts permit back pay claims to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in part on grounds that 
back pay is formally equitable. E.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618 (9th Cir. 
2010). The 1938 rule did not distinguish between legal and equitable relief as far as class treatment is 
concerned, and the 1966 authors did not intend to do so either. The fact that back pay is equitable, 
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Space does not permit me to analyze each problem and possibility this 
history raises. A general rumination on substantive motivations and their 
implications for the legitimacy of nominally trans-substantive procedural 
rules must remain for the future. In the remainder of this Article, I focus on 
two implications of the story I have told, one descriptive and the other 
normative, that go to some of the most basic issues in contemporary class 
action doctrine. 
A.  A Unified Theory of Conflicts of Interest? 
The various proposed solutions to the Rule 23 puzzle described in Part I 
try to explain the link between procedural right and remedial choice as if 
modern class action doctrine accounted for conflicting interests coherently 
and comprehensively. That no such justification has become the accepted 
gospel since 1966 suggests that this assumption is wrong. So too does the 
fact that the contours of the injunctive relief class suit owe more to 
desegregation than any cogent theory of interest representation. Perhaps a 
single, grand explanation of when conflicts matter in class actions and when 
they do not is like the geocentric explanation of planetary motion: it does 
not work because the system‘s basic design is rooted in fundamentally 
different premises. 
The mid-century shift to interest representation created both an 
opportunity and a problem. Unlike 19th Century rights-based formalism, 
which allowed broadly preclusive class judgments only in a narrow range of 
circumstances defined by abstract conceptions of rights, this new 
prerequisite could be satisfied in any case. But the degree of actual harmony 
among class members that this new basis required proved a vexing 
difficulty. Human nature meant that classes would inevitably include 
dissenting members, so a perfect harmony of interests threshold would make 
class-wide preclusion impossible anytime class member preferences were 
relevant. For this reason, the spurious class suit persisted in an enfeebled 
state until 1966. But to permit class treatment with anything less—that is, to 
accept a degraded interest representation threshold—would beg a host of 
hard questions about what sort of conflicts mattered and how much 
disharmony would be tolerable.
317
 
 At least in theory, the 1966 authors avoided this dilemma elegantly for 
money damages suits. Notice and opt-out rights enable absent class 
members with divergent preferences to exit and leave only those perfectly 
aligned with the class representative subject to res judicata. Although the 
                                                                                                                       
therefore, is not a historically valid reason to allow class treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). 
 317. Recent commentary by Rule 23‘s most accomplished scholars underscores the difficulty of 
these questions. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under 
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1676 (2008); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of 
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2009). So too does the seemingly unprincipled 
treatment of the adequacy of representation requirement by the federal judiciary. See Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Judiciary‘s Flawed Application of Rule 23‘s ―Adequacy of Representation‖ 
Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 674 (discussing incoherent application of Rule 23(e)(4) by 
federal courts). 
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court must certify that the proposed class meets the adequacy of 
representation requirement in Rule 23(a)(4), notice and opt-out rights 
arguably function as belt-and-suspenders guarantors that class-wide res 
judicata rests on a constitutionally sound foundation. The absence of such 
procedural safeguards in injunctive relief suits makes the Rule 23(a)(4) 
determination that the representative adequately represents the interests of 
absent class members all the more important. 
 It is ironic, then, that leading attempts to articulate a single threshold for 
adequate interest representation work markedly better for Rule 23(b)(3) suits 
than for their Rule 23(b)(2) equivalents. The American Law Institute‘s 
recently adopted Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation provides a 
prominent example. The ALI recommends that only ―structural‖ conflicts 
matter,
318
 not any possible divergence of class member preferences.
319
 
Conflicts are structural when, judged ex ante,
320
 a ―significant risk‖ exists 
that a representative ―might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation 
so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned 
evaluation of their respective claims.‖321 For example, a class including 
already-injured (present) claimants and exposed-but-unimpaired (future) 
claimants that sues an asbestos defendant suffers from an easily identified 
structural conflict. The present claimants want large damages immediately, 
but such payouts will deplete the funds the defendant has available to pay 
damages in the future.
322
 In contrast, when representatives have no incentive 
to negotiate a settlement that systematically favors a subset of class 
members at the expense of others, no such structural conflict appears, even 
if in the end the settlement does just this.
323
 
 To identify such structural conflicts ex ante, before actual class members 
show up and voice their preferences, the court can only focus on objectively 
identifiable interests. The reasonable class member‘s, in other words, is 
whose perspective the court considers.
324
 When money damages are at stake, 
                                                                                                                       
 318. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1) (2010). 
 319. Id. § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 320. On the ex ante perspective, see AM. LAW INST., supra note 318, § 2.07 cmt. d; see also 
Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 317, at 1688; Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in 
Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 297 (2003). 
 321. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 318, at § 2.07(a)(1)(B); see also Issacharoff & Nagareda, 
supra note 317, at 1684. 
 322. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, 
supra note 34, § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 323. In the settlement at issue in Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 253–54, 260 (2d 
Cir. 2001), the class representatives in 1984 accepted a settlement that would continue to pay victims 
of Agent Orange exposure as their injuries manifested up to 1994. After 1994, the defendant would 
have no remaining liability. The class ultimately included members whose injuries did not develop 
until after 1994 and were thus noncompensable. Nonetheless, at the time of its negotiation, the class 
did not suffer from a structural conflict, because its representatives had no idea when their injuries 
would develop and thus had no incentive to shortchange post-1994 victims to obtain more funds for 
pre-1994 victims. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 34, § 2.07 cmt. d (discussing Stephenson); 
Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 317, at 1686–89. 
 324. Cf. AM. LAW INST., supra note 318, § 2.07, cmt. d (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of 
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a court can readily distinguish between reasonable class members and those 
who might have unreasonable, idiosyncratic preferences. It can justifiably 
assume that every class member wants to maximize her recovery, look for 
systematic fissures on that basis, and ignore as unreasonable the odd class 
member who for some reason wants something else.
325
 But this objective 
inquiry is much more difficult in some (if not all
326
) injunctive relief 
settings. Not infrequently a class divides into at least two camps, those who 
want an injunction to change the defendant‘s behavior and those who would 
prefer the defendant to continue unabated. Desegregation litigation of the 
1970s presents the most famous example,
327
 but present-day examples 
abound.
328
 If both camps are reasonable, then the conflict is structural and 
the suit cannot proceed as a class action. The ALI‘s approach would either 
require courts to deny class certification to all such suits or dismiss one 
camp‘s preference as idiosyncratic and unreasonable. This latter option puts 
courts in the paternalistic and subjective position of telling people hauled 
before the court to be plaintiffs without their consent what is good for them. 
 The history discussed here explains why any such grand account likely 
will not work. While a theory of interest representation can make sense of 
Rule 23(b)(3) class suits, it alone provides an incomplete normative 
foundation for mandatory class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2). Injunctive 
relief class action doctrine as a historical matter owes a great deal to the 
imperatives of substantive justice in a context irrelevant to Rule 23(b)(3). A 
single threshold for the adequacy of representation requirement presumes a 
unified basis for Rule 23 that does not fit its original design. 
B.  Class Certification and the Relationship Between Substance and 
Procedure 
The contribution of substance-specific political commitments to Rule 
23‘s normative foundation also challenges a fundamental assumption about 
the substance-procedure boundary in contemporary class action doctrine. 
Class certification essentially involves a determination that class-wide res 
judicata is proper. Substantive justice at least partially justified class-wide 
preclusion in the minds of Rule 23(b)(2)‘s champions. In other words, they 
designed a rule that makes substantive justice a potentially relevant input for 
the class certification decision. This history conflicts fundamentally with the 
interpretation of Rule 23 in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor as refusing to 
permit the substantive results class treatment of claims might yield to affect 
the application of procedural requirements for class certification.
329
  
                                                                                                                       
Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
581 (2003), which makes this objective perspective more explicit).  
 325. YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 252. But see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Adequacy, 
88 TEX. L REV. SEE ALSO 55, 57–58 (2010). 
 326. E.g., Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomm. Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983–84 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 327. E.g., Bell, supra note 30, at 474–75 n.18. 
 328. See supra note 31. 
 329. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997). 
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In Amchem, the Supreme Court rejected a global settlement of most of 
the country‘s asbestos litigation and decertified a class of future claimants. 
One issue was whether the class certification inquiry should account in some 
manner for the fact that the certain payouts the settlement promised 
compared favorably to the very real chance that the hopeless bog of asbestos 
lawsuits might prevent individual litigants ever from recovering.
330
 The 
Court answered in the negative. Wary of ―gestalt judgment[s]‖ of fairness, 
the Court held that a settlement‘s substance could not justify a relaxed 
inquiry into whether the proposed class satisfied the certification 
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b).
331
 Policy reasons supported this 
holding,
332
 but the Court at least formally based it on what it claimed is the 
correct interpretation of Rule 23‘s text.333  
 Generalizing from Amchem‘s particulars, one can read the decision for 
the insistence that the likely substantive results of class treatment are 
irrelevant to the procedural determination at the certification threshold.
334
 
Little of the standard material for the interpretation of legal texts supports 
this determination. Rule 23 admittedly does not explicitly provide that likely 
outcomes can affect class certification requirements, but the text does not 
disavow such a connection either. When plain meaning is not dispositive, 
interpreters may legitimately turn to historical sources, such as authorial 
intent and purpose, to unpack a rule of civil procedure.
335
 As intended and 
likely understood at the time, the architecture of Rule 23 makes little sense 
unless substantive justice affects in some manner the application of Rule 
23‘s class certification requirements, in particular the adequacy of 
representation threshold in Rule 23(a)(4).  
The 1966 authors wrote Rule 23 against a backdrop of interest 
representation doctrine that required a perfect harmony of interests to allow 
a suit with broad res judicata potential to proceed as a class action. As 
mentioned, notice and opt-out rights theoretically can reconcile money 
damages class suits with this doctrine. Unless they took seriously the notion 
that injunctive relief class members necessarily had harmonious interests, 
however, the 1966 authors must have understood that the eschewal of 
procedural safeguards would leave divergent preferences within putative 
Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Since they obviously wanted courts to certify such 
                                                                                                                       
 330. Id. at 631–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 331. Id. at 621, 629 (majority opinion). 
 332. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 339–41. 
 333. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) 
(referring to Amchem and insisting that, ―[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon 
its adoption, and . . . we are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in 
the Rules Enabling Act.‖).  
 334. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (2002) (―The Court called for a strict separation of questions 
concerning the propriety of class certification from questions surrounding the fairness of the 
settlements themselves.‖). 
 335. E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833–34, 841–42, 844–45 (1999). But see 
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2499 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―But the 
Committee‘s intentions have no effect on the Rule‘s meaning.‖). 
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classes nonetheless, the 1966 authors must have known that the application 
of Rule 23(a)(4) in injunctive relief cases would necessarily depart from pre-
1966 interest representation doctrine. Those cases provided no trans-
substantive explanation for why injunctive relief class members lack notice 
and opt-out rights, they undoubtedly believed that the substantive 
consequences of class treatment justified res judicata, and they understood 
that interest representation provided the constitutional footing for this 
preclusive effect. They thus likely believed that substantive consequences 
legitimated a more relaxed application of Rule 23(a)(4). This requirement 
for class certification permits two different adequacy thresholds, one 
consistent and the other inconsistent with a perfect harmony of interests. 
(The years after 1966 saw these thresholds emerge in practice, as courts 
seemed to accept a more disunity in injunctive relief cases than in money 
damages suits.)
336
  
 A rigid boundary between substance—the results of class treatment—
and procedure—the requirements for class certification in Rule 23(a) and 
(b)—conflicts with this history. Lacking any clear textual support to the 
contrary, the Court‘s interpretation of Rule 23 seems flawed, or at the least, 
much too glib. The 1966 authors desired, or at least tolerated, a more porous 
boundary.  
Anything less than this rigid boundary, however, opens a Pandora‘s box 
of seemingly intractable problems. If the application of class certification 
requirements can account for the anticipated substantive consequences of 
class treatment, wouldn‘t the judge‘s idiosyncratic preferences make the 
application of Rule 23 hopelessly subjective? How can anything less than 
Amchem‘s rigid boundary square with the formal trans-substantivity of the 
Federal Rules? The Court may have erred as an interpretive matter, but 
perhaps the rigid boundary makes sense prudentially. 
 These difficulties warrant a much fuller treatment than is possible here. 
A very preliminary response somewhat ironically lies in the quite substance-
specific history of Rule 23(b)(2). Abstracted away from desegregation and 
the early 1960s, its story suggests a principled way to mediate the substance-
procedure boundary in Rule 23. What likely distinguished desegregation 
litigation from other substantive areas to a progressive lawyer in the 1960s 
was not just the obvious rightness of the plaintiffs‘ cause. In addition, 
private litigation was the sole enforcement mechanism for the rights at 
stake, and the failure to let this litigation proceed in the aggregate stymied 
its effectiveness. Class treatment, in other words, seemed essential to the 
vindication of substantive rights. A standard rooted in this distillation of the 
lessons of desegregation might inform class certification decisions going 
forward. If substantive rights would go unenforced absent class treatment of 
claims, a court may relax the class certification requirements. This proposal 
would support a dual approach to adequacy that, while remaining consistent 
with the trans-substantive ethos of the Federal Rules, facilitates class 
                                                                                                                       
 336. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1771, at 663 (1972) (commenting on the ―liberalized application of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites‖ in 
Rule 23(b)(2) cases involving civil and constitutional rights). 
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treatment of claims when most needed and makes class certification more 
difficult when not. 
CONCLUSION 
 The authors of the 1966 Rule 23 were not plaintiffs‘ lawyers bent on 
fueling a nascent litigation explosion.
337
 Nor were they cloistered theorists 
untangling a purely procedural problem. They were mostly progressive 
lawyers to whom, at the moment of the civil rights movement‘s zenith, 
procedural rulemaking must have seemed an irresistible opportunity to work 
for the country‘s greater good. The result of their labors was a rule whose 
requirements cannot be explained in terms of procedure alone. The debt 
Rule 23 has to particular concerns of substantive justice renders it awkward 
and theoretically suspect. But these flaws are noble ones.  
                                                                                                                       
 337. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Abraham Freeman, Feb. 27, 1965, in WRIGHT PAPERS, 
supra note 3, Box 257, Folder 4 (noting that ―incredible as it must seem,‖ Wright ―was the closest 
thing the committee had to being a plaintiffs‘ lawyer‖). 
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